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SHOULD SECURITY BE REQUIRED AS A
PRE-CONDITION TO PROVISIONAL
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF?
DAN B. DOBBSt
I.

INTRODUCTION

The plaintiff who seeks a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction may be denied these remedies unless he posts a
bond or other security. This study is concerned with a narrow set of
questions: Should security be mandatory, or should the trial judge
have discretion to dispense with it? Alternatively, should security be
required in some cases, left to the trial judge's discretion in others, and
perhaps even forbidden in still others?
The present law under the federal rule and many state statutes is
unclear and should be clarified by statutory amendment. This study
proposes to set out, in the four succeeding parts, some basic information about the nature and purposes of provisional injunctive relief and
the bond requirement, a summary of the present statutes and case law
on whether the bond is mandatory or permissive, and finally, a suggested statutory amendment to clarify that law.
II.

THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF PROVISIONAL INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF AND OF THE SECURITY REQUIREMENT

A.

ProvisionalInjunctive Relief and the Bond
Courts having equity powers are almost uniformly authorized to

grant provisional injunctive relief in two forms. One form is often
called a preliminary injunction.' This is an injunctive order issued

only after the defendant is notified and has had at least a limited opportunity to defend himself. It is provisional, however, rather than
final since the notice given to the defendant is likely to have been short
and his opportunity to defend himself limited. Thus it is quite possible that, when the trial judge hears the fully developed case at the final
t Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. Mr. H. Buckmaster Coyne,
Jr. provided substantial and helpful assistance in researching and writing this artice, for
which many thanks are due. This article was completed more than a year before publication. It has not been possible to guarantee the current authority of every citation.
1. This is the terminology of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 65. Other
terms used by courts to refer to this kind of injunction are "temporary injunction," and
"interlocutory injunction." The federal rule terminology is used here throughout.
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or "permanent" hearing, he will find in the defendant's favor, even
though at the preliminary hearing his view was entirely otherwise.
The second form of provisional relief in the injunctive mode is
often called a temporary restraining order or TRO.2 This order is issued, even without a hearing for the defendant, on the plaintiff's representation that matters are so urgent that he will lose irreparably if the
court does not act before notice is given to the defendant. The TRO
is not binding upon the defendant until he has notice that it has been
issued, but it may be validly issued in the first place without giving the
defendant the hearing that is normally a due process necessity.
These forms of provisional injunctive relief are extreme, and they
are meant to be because they are reserved, at least in theory, for extreme needs. Because these remedies are extreme and because they
operate to affect rights without a full hearing, courts have long sought
to put protective limits on this kind of relief. One way of doing this
has been to withhold such relief altogether unless the plaintiff can show
urgent need.' Another way of doing it has been to require of the plaintiff a bond or other security to protect the defendant in the event the
provisional injunctive relief turns out, on a more careful investigation,
to have been wrongly issued.4
A simple example of this practice occurs when the plaintiff seeks
a preliminary injunction against a nuisance, for instance, against the
operator of a quarry, contending that the blasting at the quarry should
be enjoined. If the judge decides to issue a preliminary injunction, he
would ordinarily require the plaintiff to post a bond by which the plaintiff and his sureties undertake to pay the defendant damages if the injunction proves to have been improper after a full-scale hearing and if
it also proves to have damaged the defendant. The amount of the
bond is also specified by the judge, usually after some discussion, formal or informal, with the defendant's counsel. In a case of this sort,
a final, full-scale hearing may occur within a few days. If the judge
decides that the preliminary injunction was wrongly issued, he will dissolve it. At this point the defendant can claim for damages on the
bond. For example, he might claim damages for idled machinery or
loss of work time, and if he proved such damages with reasonable cer2. This is the terminology of the federal rules. See note 1 .supra. Almost all
courts use this term or simply "restraining order," or the term "ex parte injunction."
3. For a brief survey of the various expressions of this policy see D. DOis,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW oF REMEDIBS

§ 2.10 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Dons].

4. The statutes are collected and cited in Appendix I.
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tainty, he would be entitled to recover such sums. 5
B.

The Purposesof the Bond Requirement

The purposes of the bond requirement have not alvays been
agreed upon or even stated. Bonds and other security devices based
upon suretyship were widely used in common-law proceedings from
a very early day, 6 though the bond requirements in America are imposed

or permitted primarily under statutory regulation.
Bonds are commonly required by statutes whenever a plaintiff
seeks a provisional remedy, whether at law or in equity.

The plain-

tiff who seeks to recover personal property by way of replevin or claim
and delivery must post a bond before he is given his pre-judgment re-

lief. 7 So must the plaintiff who seeks attachment s or garnishment9 before trial. A similar pattern is followed in civil law countries. 10
This pattern of statutes suggests that one purpose in requiring a

security as a condition to provisional relief is the fear that provisional
5. E.g., J.A. Tobin Constr. Co. v. Holtzman, 207 Kan. 525, 485 P.2d 1276
(1971).
6. The common law "pledge" was what we call a surety; even the Anglo-Saxon
law had a name for him, borh. F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TimiE OF EDwARD I 185 n.2 (2d ed. 1936). The early replevin action
was always brought against a distrainor; see DOBBS § 4.2. And from the earliest times
the plaintiff suing the distrainor must give "gage and pledge"-that is, a surety's bond.
F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra at 577.
7. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-475 (1969) (replevin or "claim and delivery").
8. E.g., id. § 1-440.10 (1969) (attachment before judgment).
9. E.g., id. § 1-440.10 (1969) (attachment bond); id. § 1-440.21 (1969) (garnishment, a species of attachment).
10. The German Federal Code of Civil Procedure applies to trials in the German
States as well. The rules for provisional remedies such as attachment also govern the
grant of injunction. An undertaking and bond are specifically provided for, in some
cases mandatory, in others not, in § 921 of that code. There is strict liability for all
damages under § 945. My colleague and friend, Doctor Gunter Roth, Privatdozent of
Law, University of Wurzburg, West Germany, has interpreted these sections for me,
though any errors are mine, not his.
The French system of procedure also recognizes and uses provisional remedies analogous to our attachments, garnishments and preliminary injunctions, and likewise exacts
a bond from the claimant on some occasions. See P. HERZOG, CIM PROCEDURE IN
FRANCE 235-39 (Smit ed. 1967).
The English practice must be read in the light of the fact that the English award
of "costs" includes, as the American award does not, attorney's fees. See Goodhart,
Costs, 38 YALE IJ. 849 (1929). Thus one element of damages covered by the injunction bond is routinely awarded as costs in the English system. Nevertheless, the English practice is to require an undertaking from the plaintiff who seeks an interlocutory
injunction. See Smith v. Day, 21 Ch. D. 421 (C.A. 1882); Ushers Brewery Ltd. v. P.S.
King & Co. (Finance) Ltd., [1971] 2 All E.R. 468 (Ch.). The statement in a standard
English legal encyclopedia is that the undertaking should always be required, with perhaps very rare exceptions. See 21 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, Injunction § 887 (3d
ed. Simonds ed. 1957).
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relief, necessarily given after an attenuated hearing or none at all, is
especially prone to error."- It is one thing to say that, in ordinary
trials, the winning party must still pay his own attorney's fees and must
even absorb the losses he may have had due to an erroneous trial court
decision. 2 But it is entirely something else to say that he must risk
such losses without so much as a reasonable opportunity to develop the
facts or the legal argumentation in the case. Perhaps one purpose of
the injunction bond, then, is simply to recompense the defendant who
has been subjected to a process of law that does not meet the kind of
standards ordinarily adopted.
A second policy or purpose of the injunction bond may be more
direct: it may be required as a means of guaranteeing that the provisional relief is sought only by those in genuine need of such relief and
reasonably confident of the outcome. In other words, its purpose may
be more or less frankly to discourage too easy an access to the judicial
process in those cases where that process does not involve a full trial of
the issues. Not only does access to provisional relief risk harm to the
defendant, it also risks enormous pressures that often are not generated
when a full trial and hearing are held. The defendant enjoined on a
few hours' notice to cease a nuisance may be subjected to enormous
losses that could readily be avoided if he were merely subjected to the
normal suit for injunction with the usual notice and a full opportunity
to defend. By the same token, the plaintiff with even color of a complaint is likely to be well aware of the pressure he can generate by a
claim for preliminary injunction. He may be tempted by tactics, if not
by need, to pursue such a remedy unless he is discouraged. The bond,
if required in a substantial sum, may operate to deter frivolous claims
for provisional relief.
11. I will first say a few words as to the history and meaning of this kind of
undertaking. It was invented by Lord Justice Knight-Bruce when ViceChancellor, and was originally inserted only in ex parte orders for injunctions. . . . By degrees the practice was extended to all cases of interlocutory
injunction. The reason for this extension was, that though when the application was disposed of upon notice, there wqs not the same opportunity for
concealment or misrepresentation [by the plaintiff], still, owing to the shoitness
of time allowed, it was often difficult for the Defendant to get up his case
properly, and as the evidence was taken by affidavit, and generally without
cross-examination, it was impossible to be certain on which side the truth
lay.
Jessel, M.R. in Smith v. Day, 21 Ch. D. 421, 424 (C.A. 1882).
12. Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 HARV. L. R-v. 333
(1959) suggests there may be some inconsistency between the usual rule that each party
bears his own costs and the use of the injunction bond to achieve an opposite result in
the case of provisional relief. Surely, however, the balance may lie in favor of free access to judicial hearings when there is a full scale trial, but in favor of full protection
to the dlefend.nt when ther is ilot sveh 4 trig],
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C. Problems of the Bond Requirement
Though there are good reasons for requiring a bond of the provisional relief plaintiff, there are also reasons against any such requirement. In the first place, the bond costs money, and the legal order
should not require the expenditure of money without some pretty good
reason to believe that something worth the cost is being purchased and
that there is no cheaper or better way of purchasing it. In the second
place, there is a risk that access to courts will be obstructed for some
legitimate litigants, either because they cannot afford the bond premium, or because they cannot find a surety willing to go their bonds, or
because they are reluctant to risk an extraordinary liability to protect
their rights. Since the judicial system is intended to resolve disputes
and since most disputants have no acceptable alternative resources for
disputes resolution, any rule that deters access to the courts must be
justified with care or be discarded. In addition, early judicial decisionin many economic disputes may tend to prevent dissipation of economic
resources and any rule that prevents such13access may tend to permit
a certain amount of hidden economic waste.
D. Assessing the Bond Requirement: the Unknowns
Since there are sound arguments for and against requiring a bond,
the legal system might rationally take any one of a number of different
positions. It might require the bond in all cases; it might require the
bond in some specified cases and dispense with it in others; it might
leave the whole matter to the trial judge's discretion; or it might even
forbid the use of bonds as a condition to provisional relief. Combinations and variations are quite possible. For example, bonds might
be underwritten by the state in all cases or those in which the plaintiff
is unable to obtain a bond from commercial sources.
Solutions to the questions raised above will be suggested, but not
without qualms, because there are a number of uncertainties. One
13. A simple example: Builder plans a building on Blackacre. Neighbor believes
it violates the zoning laws and will constitute a common law nuisance. If Neighbor intends a suit for injunction, early determination may save money, no matter who is legally
correct or who wins. If the building is built and must later be destroyed or structurally
changed to comply with zoning laws, the economic waste is obvious and could have been
avoided by quick access to courts. If the building, though in violation of zoning ordinances, is allowed to stand because of this waste factor and because early relief was not
sought, the building may cause other economic loss in the form of diminished property
values for neighboring property. If it is assumed that the building is proper in all respects, quick access to the courts to determine this fact will mean that the builder may
proceed with construction without either costly delay or needless risk. We do not know
how much this delay costs in the aggregate.
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uncertainty is in the facts. The arguments against the 'bond requirement are potent indeed-but only if people are truly obstructed in
their access to the courts. However, no one knows whether claimants
are obstructed or not. This suggests that what is first needed is not
analysis but empirical study. This study makes no such attempt for
two reasons. First, it seems better to obtain a thought-out solution as
soon as possible and adapt or change that solution if and when a suitable empirical study can be obtained. In other words, people with
today's problems ought not to have to await ultimate inquiries. And
secondly, the effect of a bond requirement on access to courts is apt to
change with shifts in the economy, the type of litigation in progress, the
kind of overall financial aid given to litigants, and other cultural factors
that could not be identified. One may therefore feel skeptical: an empirical study may reveal clearly the effect of the bond requirement on
last year's litigants without helping forecast at all its effect on next
year's. The net result is that, though there are immense unknowns, it
seems better to proceed in an orderly way toward a clear legislative
solution, with a willingness to be instructed by the data when and if it
should ever be collected.
The unknowns, however, are not all factual. Whether security
should be required from the provisional relief plaintiff probably depends on resolution of a number of other legal questions. For example, is liability on the bond absolute, or does it accrue only if the
plaintiff acted rashly or in bad faith? Is liability triggered as soon as
the provisional relief is set aside or when the permanent injunction is
denied? Is the plaintiff personally liable beyond the sum named in the
bond, or does the bond set the limits of the plaintiff's liability as well, as
the liability of his surety? What elements of damage may be considered
in assessing liability on the bond? May third persons sue on the bond
if they suffer from the provisional relief? And so on. Attitudes about
the bond requirement may well be much conditioned by the legal rules
established in answer to questions like these. In considering whether
a bond or other security should be mandatory, then, some discussion
of other problems of the bond requirement is necessary.
IlH.

THE PRESENT LAW: IS THE SECURITY REQUIREMENT
MANDATORY OR PERMISSIVE?

A.

Summary of Statutory Patterns
Except for Massachusetts, 4 all states make some statutory (or
14. See note 21 and accompanying text infra.
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rule) provision for an injunction bond. 15 Historically most of them
seem to have been derived, ultimately, from either the federal rule or
6
its statutory predecessors,' or from the New York Code of 1848.17
The language of the federal rule is that "[n]o restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security.
. . ."11 The New York Code language was that "the judge shall require a written undertaking on the part of the plaintiff' 9 to provide

for damages if the court finally decided that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction.
Both these statutory patterns sound entirely mandatory, but this
may prove to be misleading. At least twelve states have statutes which

seem to leave the matter of security to the trial judge's discretion, with
or without statutory guidelines.2 0

judicial decision. 2

Massachusetts reaches this result by

A good many statutes imply this by simply provid-

ing that the judge "may" require security instead of saying that he

"shall' do so. 22 Still others insert a specific proviso permitting the
judge to dispense with security for any good cause shown. 23 Two
the plaintiff of any obligation to post a bond when he is
states relieve
24

"unable"

hardship.

to post one or when the bond would impose "extraordinary

'2 5

In addition to these dozen states, a number of statutes

make the bond discretionary in special situations rather than mandatory, for example, in divorce actions. 26 On the other hand, within this

group of "discretionary" states, the bond may be mandatory in special
15. Appendix I.
16. See Appendix H1 for the statutory history of the Federal Statute.
17. See Appendix Im for the wording of the New York rule and the development
of the former North Carolina statute from it.
18. FED.R. Civ. P. 65(c).
19. New York Code of Procedure, ch. 379, § 195, [1848] Laws of New York 534.
20. Connecticut; Florida; Georgia; Illinois; Kansas; Massachusetts; Michigan;
Montana; New Hampshire; New Mexico; Rhode Island; Vermont; see Appendix I.
21. Damaskos v. Board of Appeal, 359 Mass. 59, 267 N.E.2d 897 (1971); Weinberg v. Goldstein, 241 Mass. 259, 135 N.E. 126 (1922); American Circular Loom Co.
v. Wilson, 198 Mass. 182, 84 N.E. 133 (1908).
22. Georgia ("may"); Illinois ("in judge's discretion"); Kansas ("may"); Michigan
("may"); New Hampshire ("ordinarily shall, and in any case may"); Rhode Island
("may"); see Appendix I.
23. Connecticut; New Mexico; Vermont; see Appendix I.
24. Florida ("unable to give bond"); see Appendix I.
25. Maryland ("extraordinary hardship"); see Appendix I. The Maryland statute
is apparently a mandatory one, with this extraordinary hardship exception, and is difficult to classify. I have not included it in the permissive group because the statute provides only that "In a case of extraordinary hardship the requirement of surety on the
bond ... may be dispensed with . . . ." Apparently an undertaking by the plaintiff
is still required under this rule. MD. R.P. BB75(b).
26. Wis. STAT. § 268.06 (1957).
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situations, for example, under a local version of the Norris-LaGuardia
27
Act for labor injunctions.
As will be indicated later, the "federal-rule type" provision has
some special ambiguities. Apart from states having that provision,
about fifteen states have statutes that contain language of a clearly mandatory sort, though it must be cautioned that the purely textual analysis does not always reveal history of the statute or aberrant interpretations of it.28 Some of these statutes have simply carried forward the
old New York Code with a verbal change here and there to make the
requirement more clearly imperative. The California Code, for example, has changed the New York language-"the judge shall require"
-to "the court or judge must require" with whatever special gain in
emphasis that may carry.20 Other states in this group are complete
departures from both the basic historical patterns and sometimes simply
state that the injunction "shall not be operative" until the bond is
given.30 Another provision is that the clerk of court must exact the
bond, a rule that raises the possibility of the clerk's own liability on his
performance bond if he fails to comply with the rule.'
Still other
statutes seem mandatory because they require a bond in fairly stringent
language, then provide for a specific exception to the requirement, leaving what is perhaps the implication that bond is mandatory unless the
exception is shown to exist.32 Other statutes in this group are difficult
to describe without undue detail, but in general they seem, purely as a
83
matter of textual analysis, to be mandatory.
27. MASS. Am. LAws, ch. 214, § 9A (1955).
28. Arkansas, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin; see Appendix I. As a matter of linguistic interpretation, Missouri and Mississippi seem arguably outside this category, though cases from those jurisdictions bear out the classification as mandatory.
29. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 529 (West 1954).
30. Arkansas ("before the injunction shall become effectual"); Nebraska ("No injunction . . . shall operate until" bond posted); Ohio (no interlocutory order "isoperative until" bond); Oklahoma ("no injunction shall operate until" bond); Virginia (injunction "shall not take effect" until bond posted); West Virginia (like Virginia); see
Appendix I.
31. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 32-207 (1962). The Mississippi rule states specifically that
the clerk will be liable on his bond for damages if he issues the injunction without taking
the bond.

Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-13-3, -5 (1972).

32. MD. R.P. BB75(b)l permits the judge to dispense with bond only on a showing
of "extraordinary hardship." Wisconsin provides that in divorce cases, the injunction
plaintiff "may" be required to post security, and that in other cases he "shall" be required to do so.
33. E.g., IowA R. Civ. P. 327 provides that the judge "must require that before
the writ issues, a bond be filed," and then permits the judge to specify a penalty "which
shall be one hundred twenty-five per cent of the probable liability to be incurred . ...
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About half the states have provided for an injunction bond in mandatory terms but leave the amount of the bond up to the judge. This
provision is often some variant of the federal rule 65(c), which states
that no provisional injunctive order shall issue "except upon the giving
of security . . . in such sum as the court deems proper." If this is
taken as mandatory, it will be clear that the overwhelming majority
of statutory provisions in America mandate a bond as a condition to
provisional injunctive relief, at least on their face. But this kind of
statute, unlike some mentioned earlier, contains one obvious textual ambiguity; it provides that the bond be set in the amount the judge "deems
proper." Is this to be interpreted as an invitation to the judge to use
his discretion in setting the amount of the bond, rather than as a command to require a bond he "deems proper" in the light of prospective
damages? If it is an invitation to discretion, does that not warrant the
belief that he may dispense with the bond altogether or require a purely
nominal bond?
Obviously this statute requires interpretation. Actually almost all
the statutes could be interpreted to mean something other than what
their texts, taken alone, appear -to say, and the statutory summary here
cannot be taken as conclusive in particular states. The "federal-rule
type" provision is especially ambiguous and especially important, however, and judicial interpretaion of it is worth an examination.
Interpretationof the Federal-Rule Type Provisions
1. The FederalInterpretation. The federal rule is derived, without substantial change, from the Clayton Act of 1914.34 Before the
Clayton Act was passed, federal statutes referring to the injunction
bond clearly provided for discretion in the trial judge. 5 The shift
from the discretionary language of those statutes to the apparently
mandatory language of the Clayton Act is itself fair evidence that the
bond was intended to be mandatory. At any rate, the first cases decided under the 1914 statute seemed to assume that there was no room
for discretion and that the bond was required. 6
B.

This seems rather clearly to negate any implication that might be found in the federal
rules that the judge may "deem proper" any amount of security, including a zero amount.
Though less clear, similar views may be taken about the statutes in Louisiana, Mississippi (reading sections 11-13-3 and 11-13-5 together), Missouri, Oregon and Texas; see
Appendix I.
34. Ch. 323, § 18, 38 Stat. 738 (1914); see Appendix II.
35. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § '7, 17 Stat. 197; Act of March 3, 1911, ch.
231, § 263, 36 Stat. 1162; see Western Union Tel. Co. v. United States & Mexican Trust
Co., 221 F. 545 (8th Cir. 1915) (applying the pre-Clayton Act law).
36. Robinson v. Benbow, 298 F. 561 (4th Cir. 1924), made the statement that no
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For forty years, between 1914 and 1954, there was very little litigation on this matter in the courts of appeals. During this period
courts recognized two situations in which the statute (or later the rule)
had no application.

One was the case in which a federal court had

acquired jurisdiction over property in litigation. It was held that in
such a case, the court could issue a preliminary injunction without a
bond in order to protect the court's jurisdiction by protecting the property.37 The other exception was even milder: a court could control
its calendar and to that end could stay its own 'hand, at least within

reasonable limits, without any bond. 38
By 1954 four of the courts of appeals seem to have concluded, or
assumed, that the bond requirement was entirely mandatory aside from

the exceptions mentioned, though in each case there was some degree
of ambiguity about the matter.39 In 1954, however, the Sixth Circuit
in Urbain v. Knapp Brothers Manufacturing Co. 40 ,held flatly that the

whole matter of requiring a bond under rule 65(c) was discretionary
restraining order should have been issued without demanding a bond "required by the
." Id. at 572. See also Monroe Gaslight & Fuel
Co. v. Michigan Pub. Util. Comm'n, 292 F. 139 (D. Mich. 1923) which says "the court
on its own motion should require such bond, unless the defendant waives it." Id. at
153.
37. Magidson v. Duggan, 180 F.2d 473 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 965
(1950); Swift v. Black Panther Oil & Gas Co., 244 F. 20, 29-30 (8th Cir. 1917). Where
the court has no control over the property, such efforts to protect jurisdiction stand on
a different footing and a bond may be required. Ferguson v. Bucks County Farms, Inc.,
280 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1960).
38. United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 7 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869
(1951). After explaining the decision on the grounds suggested in the text, the court
added that no damage could result to the enjoined party. This might be thought to carry
with it some implication that there is discretion to dispense with the bond where no
damages seem likely, but such an interpretation seems strained to this writer.
39. Third Circuit: Hopkins v. Wallin, 179 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1949). "There was
no bond deposited prior to the granting of the order, which is likewise made a condition
precedent." Id. at 137. This sounds mandatory. The court added that "[s]uch defects
cannot be cured here since each requires the exercise of discretion by the Trial Court."
Id. This second sentence might refer to the trial court's discretion as to amount. If
so, this would fit with the statement that the bond was a "condition precedent." At
any rate, Ferguson v. Bucks County Farms, Inc., 280 F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1960) seems
to be premised on the idea that a bond is mandatory under rule 65. Fourth Circuit:
Robinson v. Benbow, 298 F. 561 (4th Cir. 1924), quoted note 36 supra. Seventh Circuit: Chatz v. Freeman, 204 F.2d 764 (7th Cir. 1953). The court there concluded that
the bankruptcy act did not, on the facts at hand, exclude the operation of rule 65; it
then reversed the trial court for failure to comply with the bond requirement of rule
65. Eighth Circuit: An early decision of this circuit, Swift v. Black Panther Oil & Gas
Co., 244 F. 20 (8th Cir. 1917), recognized an exception to the bond requirement, but
apparently this and other decisions of the Eighth Circuit have proceeded on the theory
that the bond was mandatory apart from the rather narrow exceptions recognized. See
cases cited in notes 37 & 38 supra. Of the four circuits listed in this note, the Eighth
seems the least certain.
40. 217 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 930 (1955).
express terms of the Clayton Act. . .
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with the trial judge. "The rule leaves it to the District Judge," the
court said, "to order the giving of security in such sum as the court
considers proper. [sic]. This would indicate plainly that the matter of
requiring security in each case rests in the discretion of the District
Judge."14 1 There was no other discussion of the point, by way of analysis, legislative history, or precedent, which, indeed, seems to have been
wholly lacking.
The Urbain decision received support from the Second and Tenth
Circuits. 42 As of 1972, this put three circuits clearly in favor of the
trial judge's discretion and opposed to any mandatory bond. 48 Against
this group there is a group of three or possibly four circuits that appear
to hold the opposite view and to favor a mandatory bond. 44 In this
group, however, the decisions are not clear, and it would be relatively
easy for a court in this group to defect. One other circuit apparently
sidestepped the issue.4 5
2. State Statutes in the Federal Pattern. About half the states
have statutes in the federal pattern-not necessarily in the historical
sense, but in the sense that they contain mandatory language in the
first instance, then add that the amount of the bond is to be fixed in
the trial judge's discretion.
Some of the state statutes are simply replicas of rule 65(c). But
state courts have leaned quite a bit toward a stringent view of the bond
requirement and there is some tendency among the states to 'hold that
the language of rule 65 (c) is mandatory.4 6
Other state statutes, though in some respects similar to the federal
pattern, contain wording that might be regarded as significantly different as, for instance, the California "must require" language,4 7 which
may be more clearly imperative than the federal "[nio . . . injunction
shall issue . . ."language. The same California statute provides that
the bond may not exceed an amount to be specified by the trial judge.
Language like this seems to imply that the judge has no discretion to
41. Id. at 815-16.
42. Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier Ref. Co., 338 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1964); Ferguson v. Tabah, 288 F.2d 665 (2d Cir. 1961).
43. Cases cited notes 40 & 42 supra.
44. Cases cited note 39 supra.
45. Orleans Parish School Bd. v. Bush, 252 F.2d 253 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 969 (1958), apparently decided on the ground that the bond was waived by the
defendant.
46. E.g., Bayham v. Funk, 3 Ariz. App. 220, 413 P.2d 279 (1966) (under rule with
identical language to rule 65(c)); Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass'n v. District Court, 160
Colo. 128, 414 P.2d 911 (1966) (same).
47. CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 529 (West 1954).

1102

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52

set the bond at zero, and in that respect might be thought to differ materially from the federal statute. At any rate, the California courts,
have interpreted the statute to be mandatory for preliminary injunctions.48 Some have even said that an injunction issued without the required bond is utterly void and may be disobeyed with impunity.49
Thus though the state statute in question follows the general pattern of
the federal rule, it is deemed mandatory either because of slight differences in wording or for other reasons.
The only thing that seems really clear in this picture is that nothing
is really clear. The division amongst the circuits and the states, both
in legislative provisions and judicial interpretations, reflects fundamental indecisiveness and uncertainty over the purposes and effects of the
bond. It is probably time for serious decision-making on the problem.
3. Statutory Construction in the Absence of Governing Precedent: the North CarolinaRule
(a) Interpretation by analysis of the statutory language. The
preferred beginning in statutory construction is to discover "the intent
of the legislature," 50 which is to be found, or at least sought, in the
words of the statute or rule itself."1 Rule 65 as adopted in North Caro' 2 without selina provides that no provisional injunction "shall issue"5
curity. This sounds mandatory, but the rule provides none of the
mechanisms one would expect of a mandatory rule. For instance, there
is no provision that the injunction is void in ,the absence of security,
no punishment or penalty prescribed for -the parties or any judicial
officer if the injunction is issued without bond, and no minimum
amount prescribed. As already shown, this last point has been persuasive to some courts on the ground that the trial judge, not compelled
to require a minimum bond, may require one in a nominal amount or
none at all, if that is what, in the words of the rule, he "deems proper."
Thus in form the rule is mandatory, but it is so readily permissive in
operation that a mandatory intent is hard to ascribe to the drafter.
(b) Interpretation based on federal decisions. Where a state
48. Biasca v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 366, 228 P. 862 (1924); Griffin v. Lima,
124 Cal. App. 2d 697, 269 P.2d 191 (1954).
49. Oksner v. Superior Court, 229 Cal. App. 2d 672, 40 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1964).
50. Stevenson v. City of Durham, 281 N.C. 300, 188 S.E.2d 281 (1972); Person
v. Garrett, 280 N.C. 163, 184 S.E.2d 873 (1971).
51. State ex rel. North Carolina Milk Comm'n v. National Food Stores, Inc., 270
N.C. 323, 332, 154 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1967).
52. N.C.R. Civ. P. 65(c).
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adopts a statute or rule that originates in another jurisdiction, the decisional law of the originating jurisdiction is always "apposite" in interpreting the statute.5 3 North Carolina adopted its present rule from
the federal rules with changes not important here. 54 It is sometimes
said that when a state adopts a statute from another jurisdiction, any
decisions of the originating jurisdiction are presumably adopted along
with the statute itself.5 5 This has no application in the case of North
Carolina's adoption of rule 65 since the federal decisions are in conflict, either in direct holdings or in assumptions,5 6 and the legislature of
North Carolina cannot be presumed to have adopted either line of decision to the exclusion of the other. 57 Though some states have adopted
the federal statute and then interpreted it to mandate a bond as precondition to provisional injunctive relief, 58 it could hardly be thought
that the North Carolina legislature was adopting these decisions. They
could hardly weigh more than any other persuasive, but non-binding,
authority. Existing decisional law, then, does not clearly guide interpretation of the North Carolina rule here.
(c) Interpretation in the light of earlier statutes. When the
words of a statute are not themselves clear, it is sometimes helpful to
examine earlier statutory provisions dealing with the same subject. If
an old statute is changed, it is usually a fair inference that a change in
meaning was intended.5 9 Here again the clues are contradictory.
The North Carolina rule has, of course, a federal history behind
it. As already noticed, that history is a history of a shift from a permissive wording in the pre-1914 statute60 to the mandatory wording
enacted in the Clayton Act 6 ' and carried forward to the federal rule
and to the North Carolina rule. On this history taken alone, the inference is permissible, if not pressing, that the requirement of security
was intended to be mandatory.
53. Mangum v. Surles, 281 N.C. 91, 97, 187 S.E.2d 697, 701 (1972) (interpreting
rule 15(b) on this basis).
54. N.C.R. Civ. P. 65(c). In addition to the wording of federal rule 65(c), the
North Carolina statute includes an immunity from the bond requirement in suits between
spouses to enjoin interference, etc. in the course of separation or divorce. The statute
also incorporates the wording of federal rule 65.1.
55. See Ashley v. Brown, 198 N.C. 369, 151 S.E. 725 (1930) (statute adopted
from Massachusetts); Ledford v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 N.C. 63, 101 S.E. 533
(1919) (statute adopted from New York).
56. See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
57. See authorities cited note 55 supra.
58. See authorities cited note 46 supra.
59. Childers v. Parker's, Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 162 S.E.2d 481 (1968).
60. Note 35 and accompanying text supra.
61. Note 34 and accompanying text supra.
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But if the shift from a discretionary bond to a mandatory one is
clear in the federal history taken alone, the reverse may be true in North
Carolina history. Before the adoption of rule 65, the North Carolina
statute provided that "[u]pon granting a restraining order or an order
for an injunction, the judge shall require as a condition precedent to

the issuing thereof that the clerk shall take from the plaintiff a written
undertaking ..
"..62 Though there is no minimum amount specified
in the earlier statute, it did provide that some amount of security was

"to be specified by the judge," and it further used the stringent words

"the judge shall require as a condition precedent."

The practice under

this statute was a little more flexible than the words might suggest. Although the bond was in some sense mandatory, an injunction issued

without a bond was not deemed void but only irregular,0 8 and a party
enjoined without the benefit of security posted for his benefit could still
be held in contempt if he disobeyed the order.0 4

The shift from the

old statute to the new rule could be a shift in the direction of a more
discretionary approach to the question of security. Thus, whether we
look at the mandatory words of the old statute or the permissive practice under it, the present rule seems discretionary-or at least more so
than the older statute.

This leaves conflicting signals on the matter. The federal history
suggests a shift to a mandatory bond, but the North Carolina history
suggests a shift to a more discretionary approach. It is monotonous
but true that no clear interpretation is possible from all this.
(d) Interpretation in the light of other existing statutes. Two

other provisional remedies in North Carolina require bonds or other
security.

The statute dealing with attachment before judgment-which

62. Former N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-496, first codified with this numbering in 1943.
In substance it was originally enacted in 1868 as § 192, N.C. CODE Or CivIL PROCEDURn;
see Appendix M.
63. McKay v. Chapin, 120 N.C. 159, 26 S.E. 701 (1897); Sledge v. Blum, 63 N.C.
374 (1869) (dictum).
64. Young v. Rollings, 90 N.C. 125 (1884). The court required a direct attack
here by way of a motion to dissolve the injunction issued without security. As to attacks on validity of injunctive orders in the contempt proceeding itself, see Rendleman,
More on Void Orders, 7 GA. L. REv. 246 (1973).
The mandatory nature of the bond requirement was even further eroded by cases
which allowed the plaintiff to remove the irregularity by posting the bond at any time
prior to a decision vacating or dissolving the injunction. McKay v, Chapin, 120 N.C.
159, 26 S.E. 701 (1897); Miller v. Parker, 73 N.C. 58 (1875) (dictum). The net effect
of these decisions was that an injunction granted without the mandatory bond was binding on the party enjoined unless he was granted a motion to dissolve, and even if the
defendant did so move apparently he could be defeated if the plaintiff cured by posting
bond prior to a ruling on that motion.
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also applies to garnishment-provides in part: "The amount of the
bond shall be such as may be fixed by the court issuing the order of
attachment and shall be such as may be deemed necessary by the court
in order to afford reasonable protection to the defendant, but shall not
be less than two hundred dollars. . ."-1 Likewise, the claim and delivery statute makes clear that a bond is mandatory as a condition to
obtaining possession of the property. Since that statute provides for a
bond double the amount of the property value,6 6 there is no room for
the argument that the amount of the security can be reduced to a nominal sum or to zero.
These provisions make it reasonably clear that the legislature,
when minded to do so, knows perfectly well how to prescribe a mandatory bond. For this reason, the legislature's failure to do so in rule 65
suggests that no minimum was intended. But even this conclusion is
far from sure, since the legislature adopted rule 65 from the federal
rules and obviously intended to maintain as much uniformity as possible with the federal version. Although the federal version was changed,
the changes were particularly addressed to certain issues and claims
that arise in state courts but are not ordinarily dealt with at all in federal cases. Two conflicting inferences arise: that the legislature knew
how to prescribe a mandatory bond, but deliberately did not do so; or
that the legislature simply tried to keep the rule as close to the federal
as possible and that its omission to provide a parallel to the other provisional remedies was explained on that ground. Once again, we are
confronted with uncertainty. It may be added that the forma pauperis
statute does not seem to provide any67 clues, either, because it does not
appear to cover the injunction bond.
C. Summary
The law in a number of states is clear, either from the statute itself or from existing judicial constructions of it. But the federal law
is not clear, and neither is the law in those states that have "federalrule type" provisions but have not given definitive interpretation to
them. Amendments should be enacted to clarify the question but any
such amendments must be made in light of the substantive issues and
65. N.C. GEN.STAT. § 1-440.10(1) (1969).
66. Id. § 1-475 (1969): "The plaintiff must give a written undertaking . . .executed by one or more sufficient sureties ... to the effect that they are bound in double
the value of the property. ."
67. Id. § 1-110 (1969).
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policies to be effectuated-should the statute require a bond, or should
it leave the matter to the trial judge, or should it distinguish among various cases, with a mandatory bond in some and a discretionary bond
in others?
IV.

SHOULD THE BOND BE MANDATORY?

A.

Some Factorsof Importance
1. Defendant Access to Trial. As indicated earlier, provisional
injunctive relief carries with it potential for harm as well as good. When
provisional injunctive relief issues at all, it issues without the dnd of
protections ordinarily deemed necessary for a due process trial. In
addition, provisional injunctive relief creates special potential for private and public damage not present in either final injunctive relief or
ordinary adjudications of debt, title, or right to possession. Two
questions may be raised. What are the dangers of the kind of ex parte
hearing held on a TRO claim or the attenuated hearing held on a preliminary injunction claim? And how does the requirement of a bond
or other security bear on these dangers?
(a) The problem of limited legal process and unfair result. A
fair trial is ordinarily thought to require notice and a hearing with a
right to present evidence, cross-examine witnesses, and formulate arguments-in other words, a rational process for fact determination, on
the one hand, and policy formulation on the other. When the trial
process is restricted, the chances for honest error, for honest misjudgment, and for simple bias are enhanced substantially. Therefore, in
most situations, the Constitution requires notice and an adversary hear68
ing, or some good substitute.
The TRO issues without either notice or adversary hearing, and
the preliminary injunction, though it issues with notice, provides only
a limited time for the development of the defendant's case and usually
only a limited hearing. Although some such procedure must exist to
deal with truly urgent claims-and hence is probably constitutional 0
68. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
69. Arguably, the TRO is constitutionally impermissible because, like the replevin
in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), it involves judicial action without an adversary
hearing. The differences in the ex parte action on replevin and that on TRO are important, however. First, the TRO does involve some hearing, though not an adversary
one, while the traditional replevin process involved none at all. Secondly, the TRO involves assertion and proof of both emergency and inability to notify the defendant.
Lastly, the TRO usually preserves, rather than disturbs, the status quo. If a court were
to issue a mandatory TRO requiring a disturbance of the status quo, this might well be
treated like the shift of possession of property in replevin and fall within the ban of
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-the procedure is nevertheless inherently dangerous and likely to produce error.
One method of coping with the dangers presented by attenuated
hearings has been to lay down standards that forbid provisional injunctive relief unless the plaintiff shows both an irreparable injury and a
fair likelihood that he will win at the ultimate hearing. 70 Thus, ideally,
the judge will restrict relief to cases in which there are showings of
true urgency and clear right. It might be thought that such standards
would in themselves protect against error or abuse that might otherwise
occur because of the minimal or nonexistent hearing, but that does not
seem to be the case.
In the first place, when the relief is sought ex parte, there is no
guarantee that the judge will be alerted to the special standards. Even
if he invokes them himself, there is no defendant present to argue their
interpretation in the particular case, much less to present facts that
would contradict the plaintiff's claim of irgeparable injury. Still less
is it likely that any facts adduced by the plaintiff will indicate the defendant's position on the merits. What the judge sees is literally onesided: an urgent need by the plaintiff. This monocular vision denies
the judge perspective and the urgency denies him the time for reflection.
In such cases, the irreparable injury standard can hardly substitute for
facts and legal argumentation.
The preliminary injunction is not so harsh, for there the defendant
does have notice and an opportunity, however minimal, to defend his
interests. But not too much comfort should be drawn from this. In
a "federal-rule type" practice, a preliminary injunction can be routinely heard after only a five day notice of the defendant, and even that
short notice can be further shortened by the judge in particular cases. 7 1
Such notice is no doubt sufficient in a good many cases, but in others
it may leave the defendant's attorney with an impossible task. He
must understand the plaintiff's case, develop his own proof and legal
Fuentes. Short of that, however, I believe the TRO to be immune from a Fuentes type
attack, and I proceed on that basis in this article.
70. E.g., Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687
(2d Cir. 1973) (preliminary injunction against consummation of tender offer; if it were
carried out, unraveling would be impossible). Emphasis varies and the requirement that
the plaintiff must demonstrate probability of success is not always stated or followed.
In addition, the reviewing court may emphasize the chancellor's discretion rather than
the restrictions placed upon him by these standards. E.g., In re Albright, 278 N.C. 664,
180 S.E.2d 798 (1971).
71. Rule 65, regulating injunction practice, does not make this provision, but rule
6 sets out a general five-day rule on motions "unless a different period is fixed. . . by
order of the court." FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d); N.C.R. Civ. P. 6(d).
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argumentation, and arrange his schedule to attend a hearing. Very
large firms specializing in the very matter before the court may be able
to perform such tasks, but most lawyers would have a great deal of
difficulty in doing so, even in relatively simple cases. There will be no
time for the discovery process, and even the exact nature of the plaintiff's assertions may be unclear at this stage of the case. Once in court,
the defendant may find it quite difficult to match up his own hastily
assembled proof with the claims of the plaintiff. At least in one court,
the defendant may even be denied an opportunity to present oral testimony on disputed facts. 72 The judge himself cannot reasonably be
expected to master and apply the underlying substantive law in many
instances. (One recent preliminary injunction issued on the basis of
claims grounded both in federal anti-trust laws and federal securities
laws as applied to a complex economic relationship between two very
large corporations.) 71 In some cases the judge may even deny the
parties an opportunity to make legal argument.74
A good example of the difficulties with the process can be seen in
MarshallDurbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Organization, Inc."
where the plaintiffs, a group of broiler processors, alleged that the defendant was engaged in various violations of the anti-trust laws. The
plaintiffs demanded a preliminary injunction, and the hearing was set
for June 25. Some of the defendants were served as late as June 19.
At the hearing the plaintiffs introduced a total of seventy-seven affidavits, sixty-eight of which the defendants had not seen before. The
defendant put on oral testimony, after which the trial judge announced
that the hearing would necessarily terminate at 4:30 that afternoon.
The judge then divided the remaining time between the parties. At
the conclusion of the testimony the injunction was granted. The case
was so extreme in its practical denial of an opportunity for hearing that
the appellate court reversed. Nevertheless, the case is a good illustration of the sorts of pressure brought to bear on both defendant and
judge.
Apart from difficulties of this sort, the thought process of decisionmaking may itself be in jeopardy in provisional relief cases. An inter72. San Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Kennedy, 412 F.2d 541 (9th Cir.
1969); C. WhuGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2949 (1973).
73. Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1973).
74. C. WRiGErr & A. MLLER, supra note 72. Such cases would arise when the
judge deems the legal rules clear, but that judgment itself is made in an error-prone situation.
75. 446 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971).
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esting study of decision-making processes conducted by a group of lawyers and psychologists7 6 indicates that a decision maker, such as judge,
is likely to reach different decisions as the evidence proceeds. If this
is so-and common sense seems to confirm it-there are indeed dangers in an attenuated hearing. Once again, the standards limiting the
grant of provisional injunctive relief to cases of "irreparable injury" are
not self-executing. When a full adversary hearing is not available to
develop facts and viewpoints, the very process in issue denies the judge
perspective, information and reflection on "irreparable injury" just as
it denies him perspective, information and reflection on the substantive
merits. It is one thing to say that defendants must risk the consequences of an unfair decision; it is quite another to say that defendants
must risk unfair decisions under a process that ahnost guarantees that
unfairness.
(b) The problem of excessive consequences. The injunctive
power has a potential for directly affecting people that hardly has an
equal. The injunction commands personal conduct, positive or negative, and does not merely adjudicate rights and liabilities. This in itself offers potential for harm considerably broader than the potential
usually implicit in a money judgment or a title adjudication. More
than that, the injunctive order must be obeyed on pain of contempt
punishment, a sanction not even remotely possible when the money
judgment goes unpaid.77 Nor is this all. While the money judgment
may be appealed and execution of it stayed or even foiled by exemptions, the injunction must be obeyed as long as it is outstanding. If
the defendant disobeys it, he is open to criminal contempt charges,
even if the original injunction is later proven erroneous.78 These extreme consequences may be acceptable alone or in combination with
the special problems of the attenuated hearing, but they do pose dangers in fair administration of justice.
(c) The problem of judicial power without rational adjudication. Judges are immune from the claims of mistreated litigants. 9
76. Thibaut, Walker & Lind, Adversary Presentation and Bias in Legal Decisionmaking, 86 HARv. L. REv. 386 (1972).
77. See DOBBS §§ 1.3, 2.9; Dobbs, Contempt of Court, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183
(1971).
78. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967); see Rendelman, supra
note 64, for a careful analysis of the rule, with criticism. See also Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgments (pts. I-H), 53 VA.L.Rev. 1003, 1241 (1967).
79. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), "This immunity applies even when the
judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly, and it is not for the protection or
benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for the benefit of the public, whose interest
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They are likewise immune, at least practically speaking, from direct
responsibility through the electoral process; even in systems where
judges are subject to election, the elective process can seldom respond
to matters so undramatic as judicial work. These immunities put judges
in a position to exercise power without corresponding responsibility,
a position troubling to the American instinct in general and the legal
instinct in particular.
Nevertheless, judicial power has been used, on the whole, without abuse. It has been acceptable in a nation always concerned with
the limits of official power because two important restraints are placed
upon the judge that are not placed upon the executive or the legislative official. First, the judge is subject to appellate review, and he must
act with this knowledge. He must make decisions on the basis of evidence and law or he will be reversed. Not only does this operate as an
ultimate protection to the parties, it no doubt operates on the judge
himself and affects his initial decision-making and trial conduct.
A second constraint may be more important. In most cases the
judge acts only after he has followed the most rational of the public
processes-a full trial. Issues are sifted and shaped without pressure
from interest groups. Facts are developed. There are opportunities
at several stages for formulation of legal policy based upon diverse
viewpoints. Elaborate procedures have been enforced to guarantee
the parties and the judge full access to information and a complete opportunity to understand the case and reflect upon it. Working in this
adjudicatory model; the judge is constrained by a web of professional
training and habitual practice.80 These webs may be unseen; but they
are nonetheless effective and important.
These restraints upon a judge's use of power largely disappear
when provisional injunctive relief is sought. Appeals here are sometimes not even possible.81 When they are legally possible, they are
often impractical because the injunction has in effect made matters
it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence
and without fear of consequences." Id. at 554; Gillikin v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 254 N.C. 247, 118 S.E.2d 606 (1961) (similar).
80. Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits against Government Executive Officials, 74 HARV. L. REV. 44, 54 (1960), considering restraint upon
the judge's list, in addition to the effects of appellate review, the possibility of disqualifying a judge in advance and "the very formality and decorum of judicial proceedings"both elements likely to disappear in the case of provisional injunctive relief.
81. In the federal courts, an order granting or denying a TRO is not appealable,
Lowe v. Warden & Comm'r of Holman Prison Unit, 450 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1971),
though a preliminary injunctiop is,
Bq1knap v. Leary, 427 F,2d 496 (2d Cir, 1970).

1974]

PROVISIONAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1111

moot before appeal can be perfected. 2 In any event, the injunction
is ordinarily not stayed on appeal in the way an ordinary money judgment may be stayed. 3 Thus, for a period at least, the injunction can
operate without appellate review; when that review arrives, it may terminate future effects of the injunction but not its past effects. A very
large number of provisional injunctive orders are therefore outside the
realm of effective appellate review. To that extent, the role of the trial
judge in such cases is quite a bit different from his role in an ordinary
trial and the constraint upon him is considerably diminished.
More important, the constraint of professional practice developed
in a full trial disappears in the provisional injunction case. Procedure
in provisional relief cases, far from providing a rational process for development of, and reflection upon, law and fact, forces immediate decisions without the light of fact or the delineation of policy. This procedure invites the judge to leave the adjudicatory role and accept a
role of command instead. Whether the invitation to command conduct
by injunction in itself puts the judge into a role at odds with the adjudicatory process is speculative, but when the rational and orderly procedures for fact-finding and for understanding of legal policy have been
dropped, the judge acquires a power for arbitrariness not present in the
usual adjudication. This is not to suggest that judges are arbitrary or
authortarian by nature any more than others. It is to suggest that in
the American system, power without restraint is unacceptable, even
when that power is used with benevolent motives. It is possible that,
in particular cases, the judge will be deeply aware of these dangers and
will react by refusing the provisional relief. But as already indicated,
the judge is given a one-eyed view of the matter, and what he sees is
urgency and harm to the plaintiff. We could hardly count on busy
judges in such cases to perceive in their own actions misuse of power
or a threat to rational adjudication.
Thus the self-limitation of judges cannot furnish the whole answer to such problems. The rules for self-limitation are themselves
82. I list some possibilities for illustration: (1) Defendant is prohibited from involvement of some sort in a specified occasion-from speaking or attending a rally, reporting a pending case or voting in a specific board meeting. The occasion is over before normal or expedited appeal processes make review possible. (2) Defendant is required to do something positive before appeal is possible-to sell gasoline to an independent dealer even though supplies are short and this will necessarily affect competitive
structure, or to release names or files to the public even though this will forever destroy
any privacy that might be properly claimed.
83. DOBBS § 2.10; C.WRaior & A. MmLpt, supra note 72, at § 2904.
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distorted when the opportunity for fact-finding and reflection is attenuated. There are reasons, then, to seek limitations that not only act on
the judge, but also narrow the entry to the process itself.
(d) The role of the injunction bond. The plaintiff who is required to post a bond as a condition to provisional injunctive relief is
subjected to a potential for personal liability since the surety on the
bond, if forced to pay off, will claim over against the plaintiff himself.84
This ultimate potential for liability, if uncertain or unlikely, will' have
little effect in discouraging resort to the extraordinary process. If, however, the bond is mandatory and if the liability is triggered by any misuse of the process, the plaintiff who subjects the defendant to special
risks of attenuated hearings will have to be confident enough of his
case to accept some risks of his own. The premium costs on the bond
are low. They should not stand in the way of relief and probably seldom do so. The threat of potential liability, however, may serve to
screen out unwarranted claims and at the same time to protect defendants
whose rights have been dismembered without a full hearing. This may
be desirable. Against this position it may be argued that any screen
will screen out the good claims as well as the bad and that so far as it
inhibits access of the poor to courts, it is unconstitutional. That point
is considered next.
2. Plaintiff Access to Trial
(a) How access is inhibited. Where a bond is required as a
condition to provisional relief, access to the judicial process may be inhibited in one of several ways.
First, a plaintiff may be inhibited by the bond-premium cost.
Though this is not likely to represent a large sum of money-premiums
run only about twenty dollars a year per one thousand dollars 5--it may
be too large for the indigent plaintiff who nevertheless has a legitimate
claim to provisional relief.
Second, a plaintiff may be inhibited by the threat of ultimate liability on the bond rather than by its premium cost. There are no "sure
things" in law suits, and even a plaintiff confident of the justice of his
case may well hesitate to protect a right worth five thousand dollars if
he must risk a ten thousand dollar bond.
84. See, on the general obligation of the principal to reimburse the surety, Rn104 (1941).
85. Letter from the Surety Association of America (Lorenz K. Weiglein, Assistant
Secretary) to Dan B. Dobbs, March 12, 1973.
STATEMENT OF SECURiTY §
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Third, a plaintiff may be inhibited by non-economic factors: he
may not be able to obtain a bondsman within the time period needed.
The underwriter who is asked to post the plaintiff's injunction bond
does not attempt to judge the likelihood that the plaintiff will win or
lose. He attempts to judge the likelihood that the plaintiff could and
would pay the damages covered by the bond.8 6 That being so, the
underwriter must accept the plaintiff on a guess about his financial
standing and his position in the community; the fact that the plaintiff
can afford the premium is not good enough to assure him that the underwriter will go his bond."" Indeed, some lawyers have asserted in
casual conversation that bondsmen often refuse to provide a bond for
the plaintiff with an unpopular cause. Whether this occurs often is
uncertain, but on the basis of underwriting principles, it is hardly surprising to find that it does occur on occasion.
(b) Legal responses to access inhibitions. It is not necessary at
this point to evaluate solutions to the access problem, but it is desirable
to recognize that a wide range of legal response to the problem is possible and that not all forms of inhibition call for ,the same response.
For instance, one obvious response to any inhibition on access to
courts is to abolish the bond requirement, but this is not a response
equally adapted to all three forms of inhibition. In the third case (plaintiff unable to obtain a bondsman), it may seem entirely unfair to prevent
a person from reaching the court simply because his cause is unpopular
or his financial standing is unascertained by the bondsman. If he has
the premium and is willing to risk ultimate liability on the bond, he
should have his chance at the remedies provided by law. But this can
be achieved without abolishing the bond requirement. One solution
would be to provide a kind of "assigned risk" pool. Alternatively, the
state could readily provide a bonding fund for those who cannot obtain
ordinary commercial sureties. The kind of obstacle to courts represented here, then, does not call for elimination of the injunction bond,
though it may call for some other legal change.
The second kind of inhibition (the threat of ultimate liability) may
call for a quite different legal reaction. Here the plaintiff is reluctant
to post a bond not because of its premium cost but because of the ulti86. Thus underwriters are advised to assume that the injunction may be held to
have issued improperly and to estimate losses at the total amount of the bond and nothing less. L. MACKALL, PRINCIPLES OF SURETY UNDERWR1TING 199-200 (5th ed. 1940).

87. See id. at 14-22 discussing the need to estimate the principal's honesty and financial ability, with the idea that a principal of character and financial substance would
fulfill his obligation and save the bondsman harmless.
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mate liability it threatens. In general the American judicial system has
proceeded on the theory that no potential litigant should be discouraged
from resort to courts since the alternative modes of dispute settlement
are often unacceptable. At one time, courts were even reluctant to
permit peaceful settlement of disputes by arbitration. 8 They remain
reluctant to impose liabilities upon those who resort to the judicial process even when that resort is malicious. 8° They are likewise reluctant
to charge the loser with any substantial cost of the trial. 0 This principle of free access is sound. Nevertheless, the provisional relief case
raises issues quite different from those in the cases just mentioned. The
provisional relief plaintiff requests relief that may prove costly to the
defendant while at the same time he asks the court to proceed without
listening fully to the defendant's side of the story. Before the system
subjects itself and the defendant to risks of unfair adjudication, it is
appropriate to ask the plaintiff to accept some risks himself. The
plaintiff who risks nothing but premium costs need have little concern
for the defendant's rights to a hearing. There may be special cases
in which risks to the defendant are so small that a bond need not be
required. In general, however, the inhibition resulting from fear of ultimate liability is desirable rather than undesirable for the party who
asks the court to subject a defendant to its orders without hearing the
defendant's side of the case.
The inhibition that raises the most complex problem is the one resulting from poverty-the case of the plaintiff who cannot afford the
bond. This kind of problem raises issues of constitutional dimension
and requires additional attention.
(c) The bond cost and the poor person's access to provisional
relief-the constitutionalquestion.
(i) The Boddie Rule and the "Basic Right" Test. It is clear that a
poor person charged with crime must be given affirmative economic assistance when this is necessary to secure him a fair trial. For
88. DOBBS § 12.27.

89. See Byrd, Malicious Prosecution in North Carolina, 47 N.C.L. REV. 285
(1969). A similar problem occurs where the theory is that misuse of the legal process
has resulted in "duress." See DOBBS § 10.2.
90. Thus the losing party is ordinarily not taxed with the winner's reasonable attorneys' fees. See DOBBS § 3.8. There may be a number of more complex reasons for
such rules; for example, the possibility that settlement might be discouraged; Manse,
Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indemnity System, 55 IowA L. REv. 26
(1969), and the possibility that client payment of the fee is an important reinforcement
of the adversary system; Lind, Thibaut & Walker, Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Nonadversary Proceeding,71 MIcH. L. R.Ev. 1129 (1973).
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example, the state must provide him a transcript for appeal in some2
instances 1 and must provide him counsel if he cannot secure his own.
When poor litigants deal with courts in civil cases, two povertyrelated claims might be asserted. First, the state must not discriminate
against the poor. Secondly, the state must furnish "due process" in
the form of access to the courts, even if this requires affirmative assistance to the poor litigant.
The equal protection claim is relatively easy here. The state may
not discriminate against the poor litigant by imposing conditions upon
him it does not impose upon others, at least in the absence of a compelling reason. For example, the state cannot impose a double bond
upon tenants appealing summary eviction cases when no such requirement is imposed in any other appeals. 93 On the other hand, some
discrimination may be acceptable, if it does not deny access altogether.
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,94 the Court upheld a
state statute that required a bond of the plaintiff in a stockholder's derivative action where he held a small amount of stock, but did not require such a bond where he was a larger stockholder. Since the bond
was intended to discourage strike suits, which were likely to come primarily from those holding nominal amounts of stock, the statute was
thought to be sound against attacks on both equal protection and due
process grounds. One supposes that a bond to protect all provisional
relief defendants and required of all provisional relief plaintiffs would
withstand a similar equal proteotion attack.
Does the state, however, owe a poor litigant, ,as a part of due
process, an opportunity to litigate an affirmative civil action so that the
state might be obliged to furnish costs or fees if the litigant could not
afford to sue otherwise? In Boddie v. Connecticut95 it was held, under
circumstances present there, that the state would be required to pay or
waive certain court costs for an indigent civil plaintiff. The underlying
suit was a divorce action brought by a welfare recipient who could not
91. Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12

(1956).

92. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
93. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). In this case the state imposed a
double bond requirement as a condition to appeal, but only in one class of cases-tenant
appeals from summary eviction cases. The bond was automatically forfeited if the tenant lost on appeal, without regard to whether or not it matched the landlord's damages.
Furthermore, the bond was in addition to the normal appeal bond. The Court held that
this was a discrimination against the poor without adequate justification. Id. at 79.

94. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
95. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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provide the required advance deposit for court costs. The Court, on
the basis of the due process clause, imposed upon the state the burden
of paying or guaranteeing court costs in such a situation.
The holding, however, was a narrow one. The Boddie rule applies only where three conditions co-exist. First, the underlying substantive claim in the litigation must involve an issue or value that is
somehow considered basic in our society. In Boddie this was "the
basic position of the marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of
values." 90 Second, the state must exercise a "monopoly" on the means
of redress. In Boddie this occurred because one cannot dissolve marriage by agreement; resort to the state's courts is the only means of relief. Third, there must be no countervailing justification for imposing
costs that prohibit relief for the poor. In Boddie the use of costs to prevent frivolous litigation or to aid in finances was deemed an insufficient
countervailing reason for denying access to the courts for the poor.
When these conditions co-exist, it is a denial of due process to apply a
cost statute to an indigent plaintiff, even though the statute may be valid
as to all others.
In a more recent decision, United States v. Kras17 an indigent
asked permission to petition for bankruptcy without paying the statutory fees amounting to about fifty dollars. The Court held the statute
requiring fees of the bankrupt was constitutional and no fee waiver was
required. Boddie was distinguished on the ground that bankruptcy was
not one of those fundamental values in society like the marital relationship involved in Boddie and on the further ground that the bankruptcy proceeding was not the only means of redress since the bankrupt could bargain with creditors for reduction of his liability in a way
that the wife in Boddie could not bargain for divorce. These views
were applied in another recent case to uphold the validity of an appeal fee."8
Whether the views taken in Kras were implicit in Boddie or
whether Kras represents a retreat, it is clear that the holding in Boddie
is not to be taken as a broad and general principle. In the light of
Kras, it is unlikely that the state would be required to finance bond
costs for an indigent who sought a preliminary injunction against a nuisance, for example, since a nuisance claim would almost certainly be
deemed to involve something less than a fundamental right. Neverthe96. Id. at 374.
97. 409 U.S. 434 (1973).
98. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
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less, the result might be different if the plaintiff asserted a right considered "basic."
Suppose, for example, an indigent sues to enjoin official interference with a proposed, allegedly legal, Labor Day rally. The underlying right of free speech asserted in such a case is undoubtedly "basic"
in the sense the Court has had in mind. It may well be, then, that
Boddie rather than Kras would apply in such a case and that the state
would be required to dispense with any bond requirement when an indigent sought provisional relief to protect free speech interests. Even
in such a free speech case, Boddie may not require this assistance to
the indigent, either because he has other means of redress or because
the state has "countervailing justifications" for the bond requirement
that do not exist or fees charged.
(ii) Other means of vindication. In a formal sense, the plaintiff
seeking provisional injunctive relief always has other means of redress.
If he is denied a preliminary injunction for failure to post a bond, he
still has a claim for damages in the overwhelming majority of cases.
In the free speech hypothetical, for example, he might have a claim under civil rights statutes against officials who interfered with his rights"
or, if a federal official is involved, he might have an action directly under the Constitution.' 0 In either case, the plaintiff might recover substantial, not merely nominal, damages. 10 1 Since only a remedy is denied
him for want of a bond and not the right itself, he almost always has
other means of redress that will not require an injunction bond. The
question is whether the other means of redress are good enough.
Arguably even a wholly theoretical kind of "other means" is enough
to deny the indigent economic assistance under the Boddie rule. In
Kras the majority of the Court found that the indigent debtor seeking
to petition for bankruptcy had other means of redress because he could
negotiate with his creditors. Since the debtor could not pay a fifty
dollar fee, even in installments, it is difficult to believe the debtor had
any bargaining power with creditors. Kras seems to suggest that the
Court is not concerned with the relative adequacy or practicability of
the "other means of redress" in the particular case, so long as some
other means is available in theory. This in turn would support the no99. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
100. Bivins v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); see Dellinger,
Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HAV. L. REV. 1532

(1972).

101. See DOBBS § 7.3.
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tion that the plaintiff who is unable to post a bond could be denied
injunctive relief and left to redress his speech rights by a damage suit.
One might well hesitate to rely on such an interpretation in drafting a statute for at least two reasons. First, any such interpretation
permits officials to exchange a damage suit payment (or even merely
an unpaid judgment) for a basic constitutional right. It is very doubtful whether the Court would hold that the goverment could buy the
power to suspend the Constitution. Secondly, the free speech element
is not merely a protection for the speaker but for the public interests
as well. It is a means by which the listener may obtain information
and ideas. That being so, one cannot really expect that a damages
claim would be deemed sufficient to justify prior restraint of speech:
no matter how much damages might satisfy the speaker, such a route
would undermine one of the purposes of the first amendment by depriving the listener as well as the speaker of a right of "fundamental
importance."
Thus the damage suit might afford adequate redress in an ordinary
nuisance case, but may not afford adequate redress in a free speech
case. It may well be that Boddie requires special assistance to the indigent who seeks provisional injunctive relief if he asserts constitutional
rights, or at least if he asserts first amendment rights. There is certainly
a possibility that the Court would so hold.
(iii) Countervailing justifications. Are there, however, countervailing justifications for the injunction bond that do not exist for, say, the
cost deposit required in Ms. Boddie's divorce action? Here again, the
answer may be fairly clear where the underlying right asserted is not itself a "basic" constitutional right. If a TRO is granted to enjoin a nuisance and no bond is posted, the indigent plaintiff may have an extortionate hold on the defendant: the plaintiff will have nothing to lose,
but much to bargain with, while the defendant may have everything to
lose and nothing to bargain with. He may be forced to inordinate
lengths to protect his business or fulfill his obligations to third persons.
His access to courts may be wholly denied in practical effect, if no
bond is posted, since he may be forced to act before a full hearing can
be afforded. 10 2 In cases of this sort, it is easy to see that the bond re102. Professor Rendleman documents one such case in his article, Legal Anatomy
of an Air Pollution Emergency, 2 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAmS 90 (1972). There a large
group of manufacturing plants were placed under a TRO to stop emission of particulates
during the "Birmingham air crisis." The TRO was issued without notice at 1:45 in the
morning and-it turned out--on the basis of emission figures two years old. When a
hearing was held, the crisis was past and the facts came out, with the result that the
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quirement is not only justified but operates to protect the very same
right in the defendant that is asserted by the plaintiff-access to the
judicial process.
Nor can it be argued that the bond cost could be picked up by the
state. The bonding company bonds those from whom it expects it can
get recoupment of any loss. It is not insuring the legal propriety of
the plaintiff's case; it only guarantees the plaintiff's pocketbook. 103
Naturally enough it cannot do that with an indigent plaintiff. The
state, of course, could provide its own guarantee. But it is surely
doubtful whether the state is required to enter the insurance business
to guarantee both parties' access to a fair trial. Furthermore, it is desirable to discourage the harassing plaintiff by insisting that he risk
something himself if he forces risks upon defendants, and for this reason some form of risk should be placed upon the plaintiff seeking provisional relief.
Thus countervailing justifications for a mandatory bond exist in a
great many cases. If the plaintiff asserts a free speech claim in a provisional injunction case, however, the countervailing justifications may
not be so easy to identify. Suppose a case in which a bookseller sues
to enjoin official interference with the sale of magazines and books
alleged to be obscene. The interest he asserts is undoubtedly the kind
the Court has considered basic, since it is a first amendment interest.
Here the countervailing justifications for the bond are not so clear as
those just mentioned in the nuisance case. The "official" defendant
seldom has a personal or economic interest in the case of this sort, and
unlike the businessman in the nuisance case he is not likely to suffer
damage. Nor is the absence of a bond likely to create a de facto denial
of this defendant's access to the court. If the bond requirement can be
judged on a case by case basis, there seems little justification for a bond
that keeps the plaintiff out of court in this kind of case.
But judgment on a case by case basis is itself problematical since
provisional injunctions always involve cases in which the judge must
act without full facts, full briefing, or full reflection. In addition, not
every case in which free speech elements are asserted would warrant a
waiver of the bond. For example, it is possible to imagine cases in
which first amendment interests could be asserted on both sides. Suppose a plaintiff has attended a meeting of a controversial group on the
TRO was dissolved and the complaint dismissed. But the TRO, though of short duration, was of final and irreversible effect. See id. at 107.
103. See note 86 supra.
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campus of State College. Security officers of the college have made a
video tape of the meeting-supposedly private-and have handed the
tape over to several television stations, including the college's, for showing on the evening news. The plaintiff seeks a TRO to restrain a showing on the ground-whether ultimately sound or not-that a showing
will invade his privacy and associational rights under the first amendment as incorporated in the fourteenth. 04 The defendant-were it
present to assert its interests-would also claim a free speech right to
publish without prior restraint. A case of this kind is unlike the sheriff-censor case: the defendants here are likely to be damaged. To be
sure, the amount of damages will be difficult to prove, but this is all
the more reason to discourage suit in the absence of a bond. The upshot of all this is that not all free speech cases will necessarily call for
the same treatment on the bond problem.
Nor are all "official defendant" cases alike. In the sheriff-censor
case there appear to be no economic damages that might be suffered by
the sheriff if the plaintiff were ultimately to lose the case. But suppose
a case in which the plaintiffs, picketers, are repeatedly arrested by police when they appear at a grocery store protesting the sale of non-union
lettuce. The picketers sue the police to enjoin the arrests, obtain a
TRO, and return to the store to discourage patrons from entering. In
this case the formal parties do not involve the storekeeper, who has a
clear economic interest at stake. Though the picketers assert a free
speech privilege (communication through picketing), and though the
defendant is an official not personally likely to have damages, this is
again a case in which countervailing justification would exist for requiring a bond. The free speech claim may turn out to be unjustified,
as where it turns out that the pickets are engaged in mass picketing,
violence, or secondary boycott. 105 Damages are likely to result. The
justifications for a bond requirement are approximately the same as
those in the nuisance case.
Thus in some free speech cases there are countervailing justifications for a bond that do not exist in others. The only question is
whether a system can be devised to distinguish the two. One could
well despair of writing a statute that would do so adequately. That
leaves only the possibility that the judge could do so on a case by case
104. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (order against disclosure of arrest records).
105. Cf. C. Comella, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 33 Ohio App. 2d 61, 292 N.E.2d
647 (1972) (secondary boycott, distinguishing NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377
U.S. 58 (1964)).
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basis. This seems unsound, given the fact that the defendant's viewpoint, evidence, and legal position are not available to the judge when
he makes this decision. Although the plaintiffs underlying right is
important, so is the defendant's underlying right to a fair trial. The
judge, hearing an inadequate presentation, is in no position to balance
these fundamental rights.
For these reasons, an unvarying bond requirement is reasonably
justified, not because it meets ideals of carefully drawn academic distinctions, but because the alternatives, administered by human hands,
are likely to be as bad or worse.
(d) Legislative policy and the forma pauperis statutes. The constitutional power to impose a mandatory bond requirement, if that
power indeed exists, is not necessarily dispositive of the problem since
the legislature is free to provide added protections for poor persons
even if the Constitution does not require those protections.
Legislatures have in fact done very little by way of providing access to courts for poor persons. Aside from whatever legal aid may be
available in civil cases, there are forma pauperis statutes in about half
the states. Mostly these provide for a waiver of court costs in certain
cases, but they are quite limited in coverage. 1°6 The North Carolina
statute is unusually liberal in authorizing appointment of counsel for a
poor person.' 0 7 However, the statute permits waiver of a cost deposit
or cost bond but does not on its face authorize waiver of the injunction
bond. 08 Apparently this would be the result in most states.
Existing law, then, makes no special provision for waiver of the injunction bond in the case of poor persons. Whether it should do so,
and just how if so, is a question that can be addressed in stating the
final proposal for legislation.
3.

The Extent of the Plaintiff'sLiability

(a) Overriding limits on liability. If there are high premium
charges for injunction bonds, or if the ultimate liability is extensive or
onerous, strong arguments could be mounted in favor of a purely discretionary bond. On the other hand, if liabilities -are moderate or
106. See L. SILVERSTEXN, PUBLIC PROVISION FOR CoSTS AND EXPENSES OF CIvI L TIGATION (American Bar Foundation 1966); Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VALPARAISO U.L. REv. 21
(1967).
107. N.C. GFN. STAT. § 1-110 (Supp. 1973).
108. Id. § 1-109 (Supp. 1973).
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light, a mandatory bond may seem more desirable. As already indicated, the bond premiums themselves are moderate. 00 Ultimate liability on the bond has also been moderate. Indeed, courts have often
failed to secure compensation for the innocent defendant in these cases.
The cautious reluctance to compensate has been reflected in the measures of damages on the bond and, perhaps more importantly, in several
overriding legal and practical limitations which will be mentioned here.
First, the bond is not automatically forfeited when the injunction
plaintiff is ultimately proved wrong. It is not, in other words, a liquidated damages bond, 110 and the injured defendant, if he is to recover
more than nominal damages,"' must prove such actual losses as he
can. It is possible to provide a liquidated damages type bond, either
by judicial rule"x2 or by legislation, 1 3 but the practice is overwhelmingly to the contrary. In many cases the injunction defendant has
losses not readily measurable in money, and he cannot prove his damages with requisite certainty. The result of the usual practice is that
the security provided by the bond is wholly illusory.
Second, the penalty named in the bond is the limit of liability,
both for the surety and for the injunction plaintiff himself 1 4 in all but
a scattering of states." 5 Indeed, the statutes commonly do not pro109. See note 85 and accompanying text supra.
110. See Note, 73 HAv. L. Rav., supra note 12, at 344.
111. See note 126 infra.
112. In Renaud Sales Co. v. Davis, 104 F.2d 683 (1st Cir. 1939), the trial judge
ordered a bond under which the plaintiff would, if he ultimately lost, pay the defendant
"as liquidating damages the sum of $2,000 and such further sum up to $4,000 as should
be adequately proved to be the costs and damages of the defendant." Id. at 684. The
plaintiff ultimately lost because of unclean hands and the appellate court upheld the liquidated damages provisions of the bond.
113. TEx. R. Civ. P. 684 (injunctions against the state).
114. J.A. Tobin Constr. Co. v. Holtzman, 207 Kan. 525, 485 P.2d 1276 (1971);
McAden v. Watkins, 191 N.C. 105, 131 S.E. 375 (1926); Nansemond Timber Co. v.
Rountree, 122 N.C. 45, 29 S.E. 61 (1898). Implications to the contrary must be examined with care. In Burnett v. Nicholson, 79 N.C. 548 (1878) the court seems to
imply that the defendant might recover from the plaintiff personally even in the absence
of a bond, but during the period in which this case was decided the court was requiring
the defendant to show malice and want of probable cause to recover against the plaintiff;
hence the elements of malicious prosecution were met and the implication would not
carry over to the modern practice where such elements are not necessary to establish
the claim.
115. As of 1959, the Harvard Law Review listed four states on the basis of then
existing authority: Illinois, Louisiana, Texas and Vermont. Note, 73 HARV. L. Rnv.,
supra note 12, at 347. I have not attempted to make a detailed determination of current
status of this view, but it does appear to me that Vermont's adoption of what is basically
a federal rule approach may change its rule on this issue; see VT. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
A recent federal decision, not under rule 65 but under a slightly different provision of
the Norris-La Guardia Act, has held that the plaintiff is liable beyond the bond penalty,

1974]

PROVISIONAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1123

vide for a separate undertaking by the plaintiff himself, and his own
undertaking to pay damages must be implied from the bond or from
the statute requiring a bond. Hence it has been easy to conclude that
his liability is limited by the sum named in the bond. It seems arguable that, even if this rule is correct, a different rule should be applied
where, in spite of the statutory requirement, no bond is posted at all.
In other words, the plaintiff who ignores the bond requirement could
still be personally liable for the defendant's damages resulting from
improper injunction. There is little evidence of any such distinction
in the cases. The usual statement is that the plaintiff's liability is on
the undertaking he gives and that he is not liable at all unless he gives
one.'1 6 There are a couple of qualifications. If the plaintiff obtains
something of value by reason of the provisional order, he must restore
it when it later appears that it belongs to the defendant, and this rule
of restitution applies regardless of bond limits.1 " 7 There is also the
possibility that the plaintiff's conduct in procuring the order constitutes
an independent tort, and if so, he may be liable for the tort whether a
bond is posted or not and without regard to the limit of any bond that
is in fact posted." 8 The tort ordinarily involved would be the tort of
malicious prosecution, or possibly abuse of process, and it would require proof that the plaintiff acted with actual malice and without probable cause." 9 Such cases do occur, but they are rare, and for our
purposes, the possibility of an independent tort action can be almost
wholly discounted. The result is that if no bond is posted, no one is
liable at all. If a bond is posted, the limit of liability is the amount set
in the bond, and this limit protects the plaintiff personally as well as
his sureties.
Third, judges have repeatedly set the bond penalty too low or have
though the surety is not. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.

1973).
116. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 205 F.2d 944, 947 (9th Cir. 1953).
In Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433 (1882), the Court said: "Where no bond or under-

taking has been required, it is clear the court has no power to award damages sustained
by either party in consequence of the litigation .... ." Id. at 437. There are decisions,
although few, that may assume the plaintiff's personal liability in the absence of a bond.
See L. & R. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. McPhail, 92 111.App. 2d 107, 235 N.E.2d 153 (1968).
117. See text accompanying notes 191-97 infra.
118. Shute v. Shute, 180 N.C. 386, 104 S.E. 764 (1920) ($500 bond would limit
bond recovery, but if plaintiff can establish malice and want of probable cause he might
recover actual damages of almost $5,000, plus attorneys' fees not recoverable on the
bond, plus punitive damages).
119. Local 775, IBEW v. Country Club East, Inc., 283 N.C. 1, 194 S.E.2d 848
.(1973); Shute v. Shute, 180 N.C. 386, 104 S.E. 764 (1920); Byrd, supra note 89;
Annot., 150 A.L.R. 897, 904 (1944).
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not required one at all. 120 Though of course this is not always so, in a
noticeable percentage of the cases the defendant, having won the injunction suit, establishes damages in excess of the bond. 121 Even if
damages measures fully compensate him in theory, he must thus go uncompensated in practice. The defendant is entitled to ask for a higher
bond, and perhaps he is entitled to present testimony as to the proper
amount, but these rights may also prove illusory, or at least inadequate.
In the first place, the defendant is not heard at all on TRO, and the
judge must set the penalty of the bond wholly on the basis of the plaintiff's suggestions and his own guesses. The crucial issues may be determined on this bond, and if so the defendant will never have the opportunity to seek a higher penalty. 22 In the second place, it is very
difficult to present proof as to a proper amount. Not only are the defendant's interests likely to be difficult to measure in dollars, but the
final effect of the injunction may not be perceived for a long period.
It is difficult to believe that the defendant will have much scope for
getting the bond penalty raised -at late stages in the case when he is apt
to have the most information about his probable damages. It is hard
to imagine that the defendant is likely to succeed in such a maneuver
in the hour immediately before the final trial, for example. In the
third place, the defendant will probably have only a limited time in
which to present his case, and he may be forced to use that time presenting the merits rather than evidence on the bond penalty.' 2 The
low bond penalty not only fails to discourage needless suits-and hasty
ones-but it fails to protect the injured defendant.
Fourth, there is no indication that courts would be willing to impose liability for non-economic harms in the way they do in many actions at law. For instance such claims as those for false imprisonment,
invasion of privacy, denial of the right to vote, malicious prosecution,
as well as statutory civil rights, claims have all been the basis for substantial damages awards even though no economic loss is shown, though
120. E.g., Tenth Ward Road Dist. No. 11 v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 12 F.2d 245 (5th
Cir. 1926) (railroad enjoined collection of road taxes, by the time taxes were ultimately
collected, building prices had increased by $26,000, local government recovers nothing
since there was no bond).
121. Broome v. Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council, 206 So. 2d 184 (Miss. 1967)
($1500 bond, $6,500 damages); McAden v. Watkins, 191 N.C. 105, 131 S.E. 375 (1926)
($500 bond, $1,175 damages); Nansemond Timber Co. v. Rountree, 122 N.C. 45, 29
S.E. 61 (1898). The result is magnified when no bond at all is posted as in Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 205 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1953).
122. See Broome v. Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council, 206 So. 2d 184 (Miss.
1967).
123. See discussion in text accompanying note 75 supra.
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there are local variations. 12 4 Yet if the preliminary injunction deprives

the defendant of some analogous right, recovery is always based on and

26
limited to economic losses _ or at least losses based on property.1
Fifth, a few cases have supported a rule that gives the trial judge
discretion to refuse an award of damages even where a bond has been
posted and even where losses are clearly established. The discretion

rule arose before the bond was required by statute and was applied in
a case where the injunction, though erroneous in extent, was at least
partly correct.' 27 It has been doubted whether such a rule should obtain since the passage of bond statutes,' 2 8 but there is recent support
for it. 29 Where such a rule is applied, the defendant has lost something he was entitled to keep, and he has lost it in litigation without
the normal procedural protections. Nevertheless, he is left to those

losses on the basis of "equitable discretion."

In short, there is no in-

clination in the courts to award immoderate recoveries to the injured

defendant, much less to award exorbitant ones.
(b) Damages measures and items of recovery.
(i) General
damages. Courts'"0 and, in some states, statutes' 31 sometimes speak
of measuring damages on -the injunction bond by an equitable standard.
But in practice this does not seem to result in measures of damages dif-

ferent from those used in other cases. Courts usually permit recovery
124. Donus § 7.3.
125. See UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 238 La. 108, 113 So. 2d 899 (1959)
(wrongful injunction against picketing, recovery based on attorneys' fees and similar
costs); Broome v. Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trade Council, 207 So. 2d 184 (Miss. 1967) (preliminary injunction against picketing, injunction improper as matter of law).
126. Weierhauser v. Cole, 132 Iowa 14, 109 N.W. 301 (1906), allowed a recovery
of damages where the injunction had enabled the defendant to exercise wrongful dominion over the highway bordering plaintiff's house, more or less equivalent to permitting
nominal damages in a trespass case.
127. Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433 (1881).
128. See Note, 73 HARV. L. REv., supra note 12, at 342. Russell v. Farley, 105
U.S. 433 (1881), took note that the discretion rule applied where there was no statute
requiring a bond.
129. Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1973). Discretion should be distinguished from a rule that forbids recovery of damages
in all cases of a certain class. In Wissman v. Goucher, 150 Tex. 326, 240 S.W.2d 278
(1951), A obtained an injunction against B's breach of contract. The contract was one
for which A has paid consideration but its restrictive covenants were overbroad, with
the result that the contract was unenforceable as against public policy. The injunction
was therefore dissolved, but the court refused damages on the ground that no damages
should be given where the injunction only compelled compliance with a promise for
which consideration had been paid.
130. E.g., State ex rel. Shatzer v. Freeport Coal Co., 145 W. Va. 343, 115 S.E.2d
164 (1960).
131. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 69, § 12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973) speaks of "such damages as the nature of the case may require, and to equity appertain,"
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of nominal damages if no others are proven, 32 general damages roughly
of the kind permitted in an analogous tort or contract damages case,
and special damages.13 3

As in other actions,1

4

special damages are

recoverable only if they are proven with reasonable certainty and only
if they are deemed "proximate"' 35 results of the provisional injunctive
order. General damages may in some instances be measured more cautiously than in tort or contract cases-as in the case of non-economio
harms-but otherwise are quite similar.
In many instances analogies from the law of tort or contract damages furnish obvious guides. If the injunctive order wrongly deprives
the defendant of possession of land or chattels, the rental value during
the period in which he was deprived of use is an appropriate measure

of damages.' 36 Since this is an item of general damages, there is no
need to show actual specific loss of tenants, or even that the property
would have been rented in the absence of the injunction.'1 7 This is
exactly the rule ordinarily used in cases of dispossession of realty or

chattels by a tortfeasor,138 who, incidentally, may be just as innocent of
wrongdoing as the provisional injunction plaintiff.'
If the injunction has the effect of permitting physical damage or
132. E.g., Union Springs Tel. Co. v. Green, 47 Ala. App. 427, 255 So. 2d 896
(1971). Statutory language of course may preclude nominal damages.
133. E.g., J.A. Tobin Constr. Co. v. Holtzman, 207 Kan. 525, 485 P.2d 1276 (1971)
(loss of profits resulting from the injunction).
134. See generally DOBBS §§ 3.2, .3.
135. State ex rel. Stout v. Rogers, 132 W. Va. 548, 52 S.E.2d 678 (1949) (remote,
conjectural damages excluded).
136. See J.A. Tobin Constr. Co. v. Holtzman, 207 Kan. 525, 485 P.2d 1276 (1971)
(rental value of equipment idled by injunction); De Camp v. Bullard, 159 N.Y. 450,
54 N.E. 26 (1899) (use value of stream for floating logs); State ex rel. Shatzer v. Freeport Coal Co., 145 W. Va. 343, 115 S.E.2d 164 (1960) (rental value of equipment idled
by injunction).
137. If the defendant attempts to prove that the injunction caused him to lose a specific tenant, he is attempting to prove special damages. In such a case recovery will
be denied unless he proves with adequate certainty that the injunction caused loss of the
tenant. State ex rel. Stout v. Rogers, 132 W. Va. 548, 52 S.E.2d 678 (1949). In such
a case he should show rental value of the land on the general rental market as a measure
of the possessory rights he has lost.
138. See DOBBS §§ 5.8 (land), .11 (chattels).
139. The tort of conversion does not require bad motive or evil intent and neither
does the tort of trespass to land. For example, the mistaken improver, who builds on
A's land in the belief that it is his own, is liable to A for rental value of the land.
DOBBS § 5.8. One can convert personalty in a number of honest ways, for example,
by honest misdelivery to the wrong person. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TE LAW
OF TORTS § 15 (4th ed. 1971). In suits for replevin, and by the modem view, in suits
for conversion, the true owner may recover use value of the converted article. See
DoBs § 5.11. Thus no distinction should be made between a tort claim of this sort
and the injunction bond claim causing similar harm, and none is in fact made in tho
gses I have Qbservec,
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destruction to the property of the defendant, the measure ordinarily
mentioned is the diminished value of the property. 140 No doubt in an
appropriate case, the defendant could repair the property and charge
1 41
reasonable repair costs instead.
Not all provisional injunctive orders deal directly with tangible
property. One kind of order that appears in some of the cases is the
order restraining the defendant from working for plaintiff's competitor
in alleged violation of a covenant. Either the covenant or the injunction or both is frequently overbroad in such cases and is overturned
when a hearing is held. The defendant has in such cases often lost
either wages or an opportunity to make profit. Subject to the rule requiring him to minimize damages, he is entitled to recover lost wages
1 42
or loss of earning capacity.
A number of cases involve provisional injunctive orders against
the sale of property that stands as security for a debt. Typically the defendant has loaned money to T and has taken a mortgage or deed of
trust. T has defaulted and defendant is about to sell the property to
pay T's debt. However, plaintiff claims some interest in, or lien on,
the property and obtains a TRO to prevent the sale. When the TRO
is dissolved and defendant proceeds to conduct the sale, and if the
price pays the debt due him, he will have no damages. If the property
has diminished in value while the TRO was in effect, the delayed sale
may be insufficient to pay T's debt to defendant. In that case, the
diminished value of the security, so far as it reduces defendant's collection from the sale, measures defendant's claim on the bond. 4 Here
140. See Nansemond Timber Co. v. Rountree, 122 N.C. 45, 29 S.E. 61 (1898) (removal of timber by plaintiff during injunction, timber value recoverable); Du Bose v.
Bultman, 215 S.C. 468, 56 S.E.2d 95 (1949).
141. If the analogy to tort damages is accepted, this would seem to follow. See
DOBBS § 5.1.

142. See Josephson v. Fremont Indus., Inc., 282 Minn. 51, 163 N.W.2d 297 (1968).
For the difference between "lost wages" and loss of earning capacity see DoBBs § 8.1.
143. mT]he measure of the damages which are recoverable by the creditor.
is ordinarily the depreciation, if any, in the value of the property conveyed
by the mortgage or deed of trust, as security for the debt, from the date of
the issuance of the injunction to the date of its dissolution. The only interest
which the creditor has in the property is its preservation as security for his
debt . . . . If, notwithstanding the injunction, the creditor collects his debt,
interest and costs, by the sale of the property, after the dissolution of the
injunction or otherwise, he sustains no damages ....
Gruber v. Ewbanks, 199 N.C. 335, 339, 154 S.E. 318, 321 (1930). Some cases state
more broadly that the measure of damages is the "diminution in the value of the security
during the period of restraint," Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 83 Nev. 196,
201, 427 P.2d 1, 4 (1967). But I take it that this broader formulation is not meant
to cover more than the defendant-creditor's losses and would have no application to the
situation in which, though the security was impaired during the injunctive period, it remained sufficient to pay the debt, interest and costs.
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again, the recovery does not exceed the actual economic loss and is in
line with what one would expect in a tort action brought for impairing
14
security.
A difficult problem can arise if the provisional injunctive order
prevents consummation of a contract so that the injunction defendant
is denied the fruits of his bargain. Suppose A contracts to sell a building to B for 200,000 dollars. On the date for closing, the building has
a market value of 175,000 dollars. A's bargain is worth 25,000 dollars, and if B breaches his contract to purchase, he will be liable in that
sum. This will be true whether or not B acts in bad faith. It will be
true whether or not the building diminished in value after the contract
was made. These are the general rules in contract actions. 148 Suppose
now that C, a tenant in the building, obtains a TRO forbidding the
proposed sale. This makes the sale impossible or otherwise excuses
B's performance. The TRO, on hearing, is dissolved, but by this time
B's performance is excused and A has lost his sale. The value of his
building has not diminished-it is still worth the same 175,000 dollars
it was worth when the TRO was issued. However, A has lost his expectancy or bargain with B. What is C's liability on the bond?
Two analogies come to mind. One analogy compares the injunction plaintiff in this situation to a contract breaker who causes loss of
A's bargain. If this comparison is made, it is clear that the injunction
plaintiff would be liable on our facts for 25,000 dollars-A's loss of
bargain.' 48 The other analogy compares the injunction plaintiff to one
who induces another to breach A's contract. This is a tort if it is done
with intent and without a privilege. 4 If this comparison is made, it
is again clear that the injunction plaintiff would be liable for 25,000
dollars as the loss of A's bargain, since that is the measure of damages
against a breach inducer. 48 Neither analogy is entirely satisfactory.14
144. See Knudsen v. Hill, 227 Cal. App. 2d 639, 38 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1964) (valuation of note). It is possible to provide a rule allowing greater recovery by treating the
security instrument as saleable property itself. One could allow diminished value of that
instrument without regard to the question whether final sale was made and whether it
was sufficient to pay the debt. But if this might be done in a damage suit, it does not
seem to be cofitemplated in the bond actions.
145. See DonBs § 12.1.
146. Id.
147. See W. PRossER, supranote 139, at § 129.
148. DOBBS § 6.4.
149. The first is not because the injunction plaintiff is not himself in the contractual
relation. The second is not because, though the injunction plaintiff is an intentional
destroyer of the contract obligation in the legal sense that he knows the obligation will
be destroyed by his act; see Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955),
he is undoubtedly privileed, in the absence of malice, to defend his self-interest by
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On the other hand, it is clear that the injunction defendant in our case
has lost a bargain of 25,000 dollars, and to the extent that the bond
recovery is aimed at full compensation, this should ordinarily be the
amount of recovery.
A Florida case on quite similar facts, however, called for a different measure of damages.' 50 In that case the trial court attempted to
give the injunction defendant his expectancy by deducting the assumed
value of the building from the contract price. 15 ' The appellate court,
however, held that the proper measure of damages was the amount by
which the property diminished in value during the term of the provisional injunction or the delay period.152 The court relied on two cases
for this rule, but neither case involved a specific, existing resale contract, and consequently neither could have considered the possibility
of allowing an expectanoy type recovery.
If the Florida decision is applied to a contract like that in our example, it will mean that, though the landowner-defendant has lost
25,000 dollars expected "profit" as a result of the improper injunction,
he will recover nothing at all unless his building has-fortuituously
enough-diminished in value. If it does diminish in value during the
term of the injunction, that diminished value, of course, is not likely to
coincide with the amount lost on the bargain.
On the other hand, if the Florida decision is applied to a contract
in which the landowner stood to lose money, there may be a readily
understandable reason for the rule. Suppose the landowner-defendant
had contracted to sell his 175,000 dollar building for 160,000 dollars.
A completed transfer would cause him a net loss of 15,000 dollars. He
is lucky if the injunction prevents a sale and excuses his obligation to
the purchaser, and he certainly has no general damages. But, once
the contract liability is discharged, it is possible to feel that the landbringing suit. Any distinction based on the fact that in the case I have posed, the injunction plaintiff has destroyed B's obligation but has not induced a technical breach
should be discounted.
150. Global Contact Lens, Inc. v. Knight, 254 So. 2d 807 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971),
cert. denied, 260 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 1972).
151. The trial court erred in computing the value of the building because it based
its computation on the "book value" of the property, that is on original cost less depreci-

ation, rather than on fair market value. But the appellate court rejected the expectancy
test in toto, not merely the trial court's computation of value.
152. Cases mention two different measures. One is the difference between the
value of the property on the date of the injunction and the date of its final sale, see
Kolin v. Leitch, 351 Ill. App. 66, 113 N.E.2d 806 (1953). The other is the difference
between the value of the property on the date of the injunction and the date the injunction is dissolved, see Josephson v. Fremont Indus., Inc., 282 Minn. 51, 163 N.W.2d 297

(1968).
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owner is entitled to have existing value in his hands equal to the value
he had when the provisional injunction was issued. Thus if, during the
injunction period, the value of the building falls from 175,000 dollars
to 170,000 dollars, the Florida court would apparently award the landowner-defendant a 5,000 dollar recovery on the bond. There was evidence in the case that the contract was indeed a losing contract. It is
therefore possible to interpret the rule as a rule addressed to losing contracts, not a rule addressed to profitable ones.
How does this decision stack up with liabilities for similar damages where no bond is required? First, if the Florida rule applies to
profitable as well as unprofitable contracts, it gives the injunction defendant, for most cases, a vastly smaller recovery than he would obtain
in breach of contract cases and one smaller than his actual damages.
Second, the Florida rule, as applied to unprofitable contracts, gives the
defendant nothing at all unless the building value has diminished during the injunction term. If it has diminished, the rule goes on to say
that the damages are not to be offset by the collateral savings from nonperformance. This version of the rule operates a good deal like some
ordinary rules in contract or tort suits. For example, the breaching
party to a contract is often held liable for more than the contract price,
and the non-breaching party is put in a better position than if there
had been full performance on both sides. This occurs in exactly the
kind of situation supposed here-a losing contract on the part of the
non-breaching party. The non-breaching party is allowed to recover
the true value of what he has given, even though this exceeds the contract price. 153 In theory, this is because the breaching party has received that value, but quite often this is more theoretical than real. 15 4
Thus courts have often achieved the result that will be achieved under the Florida rule-a recovery beyond actual loss. Courts have also
said that the victim of a tort may recover his damages without any deduction for any collateral benefits he receives from the tort. 1 5 It
would be possible in our case to see the loss as diminished property
value and the savings from non-performance as a collateral benefit.
This may not be a good rule, but it is not wholly at odds with judicial
practice in cases not involving bonds.
153. See DOBBS § 12.24.
154. Often the cost to the non-breaching party is taken as the measure of the worth
received by the breaching party. This in fact is inaccurate and the breaching party is
thus often held for "value" he did not get. See id. § 12.24; Childres & Garamella, The
Law of Restitution and the Reliance Interest in Contract, 64 Nw. U.L. Rav. 433 (1969).
155. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 920 (1939); DOBBS § 3.6.
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This survey of general damages, though it does not pretend to be
exhaustive, gives a strong impression of caution on the part of judges
in assessing liability on the injunction bond. There seems no basis for
fear that a mandatory bond would produce excessive liability, if the
standard is just compensation for loss.
(A) Generally. In most of the bond
(ii) Special damages.
cases, the significant award is the award for special rather than general
damages, most commonly the award for attorneys' fees. Special damages are those not based on a general model of expected loss like diminished property value or loss of bargain under a contract. They are
items of particular expense proven particularly in the case before the
court. More exacting proof is often demanded when special damages
are sought, and actual, realized loss must be established. 156 When
special damages are sought, the claimant must prove the damages with
reasonable certainty and must convince the court that they are not too
remote or approximate.1 57 He must also show that any expenses incurred and claimed as damages were reasonable. 5 '
Among the kinds of special damages that have been successfully
claimed when proof is adequate are: loss of profits, 5 9 increased construction costs where construction was delayed by the injunction, 160
and various costs of the preliminary litigation.' 6 ' All of these costs, if
allowable at all, are allowable in addition to the general damages already mentioned.
(B) Avoidable consequences. The rule that one must minimize
his damages applies to claims made on injunction bonds. Two rather
special situations arise in these cases. One involves a provisional order
that is made by a court having no jurisdiction. If there is no jurisdiction, the order could be disobeyed with impunity, at least if one could
be sure that the bootstrap principle would not apply.' 62 It could therefore be argued that a defendant subjected to such an order should minimize his damages by disobeying it, and plaintiffs have in fact made just
156. See DoBBs § 3.2.
157. See State ex rel. Stout v. Rogers, 132 W. Va. 548, 52 S.E.2d 678 (1949).
158. See Union Springs Tel. Co. v. Green, 47 Ala. App. 427, 255 So. 2d 896
(1971).
159. See J.A. Tobin Constr. Co. v. Holtzman, 207 Kan. 525, 485 P.2d 1276 (1971);
cf. Kelly v. Schorzman, 3 Wash. App. 908, 478 P.2d 769 (1970) (under special statute).
160. See Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 134 Ala. 302, 32 So. 678
(1902); City of Elkhart v. Smith, 135 Ind. App. 108, 191 N.E.2d 522 (1963).
161. Expenses of the trial on the permanent injunction are not a result of the provisional orders in the case and are not recoverable, see Gruber v. Ewbanks, 199 N.C.
335, 154 S.E. 318 (1930); Midgett v. Vann, 158 N.C. 128, 73 S.E. 801 (1912).
162. See Dobbs, supranote 78.
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such an argument. Courts, however, have usually said that the defendant is under no obligation to risk a contempt charge, and he is free to
comply with the order and claim damages on the bond, even if it turns
out in the end to be void' 0 3-put otherwise, even if the court was without jurisdiction to enforce the bond based on that order.'6 4
A second situation somewhat peculiar to claims on the injunction
bond arises when the exact scope of the injunctive order is uncertain.
The amount of damage the defendant suffers from an erroneous order
may depend on how he interprets the order. In an Indiana case, a
plaintiff procured a provisional injunction against a former employee,
enjoining compliance with a covenant not to compete. The covenant by
its terms was limited to a six-month period, but the injunctive order
specified no time limit. The hearing on the permanent injunction was
not held until after the six-month period had expired. The defendant
asked for damages based upon the over-extensive injunction, but the
court refused to permit this recovery, saying that defendant could have
sought clarification or modification had he desired.',
In other words
on the facts, it was deemed reasonable for the defendant to seek clarification rather than undergo additional damages. The question no doubt
turns on the factual peculiarities of each case. Once the issue has been
litigated to the stage of a provisional injunction, it is not always reasonable to expect the defendant to seek modification, nor would it be desirable repeatedly to re-litigate at the preliminary stage of proceedings.
Thus in some cases the injunction defendant can recover his damages
even though they might have been avoided had he sought and obtained a
modification of the provisional order.'
Where the cases depart from the orthodox avoidable-consequences
analysis, they seem to favor the injunction plaintiff rather than the injunction defendant-a departure that itself seems orthodox in the injunction bond cases. For instance a North Carolina case'0 7 involved
an injunction against removal of certain timber. The defendant obeyed
the injunction until it could be dissolved, and as a result of his obedience, his teams were idled. He asserted a claim for damages based upon
the cost of feeding the teams thus idled. The usual rule puts the bur163.
P.2d 475
164.
165.
(1965).
166.
167.

See Mason v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 60 Cal. App. 2d 587, 141
(1943).
Broome v. Hattiesburg Bldg. & Trades Council, 206 So. 2d 184 (Miss. 1967).
Montgomery v. Lincoln Laboratories, Inc., 138 Ind. App. 356, 209 N.E.2d 273
Du Bose v. Bultman, 215 S.C. 468, 56 S.E.2d 95 (1949).
Nansemonol Timber Co. v. Rountree, 122 N.C. 45, 29 S.E. 61 (1898).
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den of proof upon the person against whom damages are claimed to
show that damages could have been avoided. Nevertheless, the court
here denied any recovery for feeding the animals on the ground that the
injunction defendant had failed to show he could not have avoided such
losses-a reversal of the usual burden. Perhaps the decision is justified
on other grounds, 6 ' but it does seem to reflect a predilection, so commonly found in the cases, for protecting the injunction plaintiff no matter how damaging the provisional injunction might have been to the
defendant.
(C) Attorney's Fees. The backbone of special damages awards
in most instances is the award of the attorney's fee. Most courts have
sustained such awards under governing statutes.'0 9 Some of the courts
limit such fee recoveries to fees earned in procuring a dissolution of the
TRO or the preliminary injunction since the statute and the bond are
intended to protect against improvident provisional relief, not against
the main suit.' 7 0 Other courts have taken a more liberal position and
have said that, at least when the attorney seeks dissolution of a provisional order but is forced to defend the main action because the dissolution was improperly denied, the additional fees incurred on the
main action are attributable to the improvident provisional relief and
can be awarded.'
Even in such courts, however, the governing rule or statute may
be interpreted to limit the recovery of attorneys' fees so that the aggrieved defendant is still not made whole. The Field Code language
on injunction bonds was that the bond covered such damages as might
be sustained "by reason of the [provisional] injunction, if the court
shall finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto."'7 s This
168. The award of damages based upon timber losses, if made on the basis of gross
income from lost timber sales during the injunction period, would have included income,
some of which ordinarily would go to feed the animals. Hence, any additional recovery
for feed might have duplicated existing awards.
169. Annot., 164 A.L.R. 1088 (1946).
170. E.g., Mason v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 60 Cal. App. 2d 587, 141
P.2d 475 (1943) (but where TRO work was necessarily interwoven with merits, trial
judge must set fee as best he can); UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 238 La. 108,
113 So. 2d 899 (1959).
171. The distinction between that case and this is that in this case the defendant did appear and oppose the continuance of the [provisional] injunction.
The court, however, continued the injunction. There was thus imposed upon
To such a trial he
the defendant the obligation of trying the action . . .
was forced by the order of the court continuing the injunction, and the
necessary expenses incurred by him in this procuring relief from the restraint
contained in the injunction order were properly damages caused by the
granting of the injunction.
, 67 N.Y.S. 375, 378 (1900).
Youngs v. McDonald, 56 App. Div. 14, 172. New York Code of Procedure, ch. 379, § 195, [1848] Laws of New York 534.
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language by its terms eliminates damages, including attorneys' fees, incurred before the provisional order is issued or even in defending
against -the issuance of that order. Thus the fee earned in -the initial
hearing may be denied though the fee earned in an effort to dissolve the
preliminary injunction after it has issued is granted. 173 This approach of
course does not make the defendant whole. It is no doubt justified in
states like New York'74 and California 1 5 where the old Field Code language is retained so that damages must be incurred "by reason of the injunction." But the federal rule language, now in force in a good many
states, is rather different. Rule 65 drops the "by reason of" language
and substitutes "for the payment of such costs and damages as may be
incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been wrongfully
enjoined or restrained." The language of this provision is open to the
construction that any damages incurred may be recovered, including
those incurred in trying to prevent the provisional order in the first
place. At least one court, without taking note of the language shift
from the Field Code to the federal rule, has said that the recovery would
still be limited to fees incurred after the first injunction was issued even
17 6
though -thefederal rule had been adopted.
In states permitting recovery of attorneys' fees on the bond, the
aggrieved defendant usually has some, though not complete, relief. In
a handful of jurisdictions, the aggrieved defendant gets no relief at all
under the heading of attorneys' fees. The rule against recovery of attorneys' fees on the bond was adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in 1872 in Oelrichs v. Spain 77 at a time when there was no rule
or statute requiring a bond at all."' 8 The reasoning of the court was
based upon the general rule that attorneys' fees are not recoverable
items of damages, and the Court made no distinction between ordinary
cases and provisional relief cases where bonds had been posted. In
any event the holding had nothing to do with statutory bonds. Nevertheless, a series of federal court decisions followed this rule, taking no
173. 'The services of counsel that were employed by him to resist the motion were
rendered by virtue of the order to show cause why the injunction should not be granted,
and not by reason of the injunction." Curtiss v. Bachman, 110 Cal. 433, 439, 42 P.
910, 912 (1895); accord, Youngs v. McDonald, 56 App. Div. 14, 67 N.Y.S. 375 (1900).
174. N.Y. Civ. PRAc.LAW § 6312(b) (McKinney 1963).
175. CAL,. Civ. PRO. CODE § 529 (West 1954).
176. Artistic Hairdressers, Inc. v. Levy, 87 Nev. 313, 486 P.2d 482 (1971) (dictun).
177. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 211 (1872).
178. The first general federal bond statute appears to have been enacted in Act of
June 1, 1872, ch: 255, § 7,17 Stat. 197.
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notice that statutes had been enacted since Oelrichs.179 This series of
cases, though they are only a handful in number and though they almost wholly ignore statutory changes, have been treated as "the federal
rule." It has yet to be decided whether enactment of what is now rule
65 will affect the recovery of attorneys' fees or not.
In the meantime, Oelrichs influenced a number of state courts.
Texas, 80 Tennessee, 81 Maryland, 182 and Virginia' 3 adopted a rule
against recovery of attorneys' fees on the injunction bond. Independently of Oelrichs, Maine, 8 4 Pennsylvania, 18 and North Carolina 8 6
also ruled against recovery of such fees. The first two states seem to
have done so partly out of hostility to attorneys' fees recoveries generally. North Carolina seems to have done so mainly because, at the
time the decision was made, a statute provided a flat fee for attorneys
in all cases and to have awarded an additional fee would have been to
duplicate recoveries. 8 7 The statute in question has long since been
repealed,' 8 8 but the rule against an award of attorneys' fees though
179. Tullock v. Mulvane, 184 U.S. 497 (1902), was decided after the 1872 statute
was enacted, but it made no mention of the statute. In 1914, the basis of present rule
65 was enacted as part of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 16-18, 38 Stat. 737-38 (1914).
The decisions since that time have been lower court decisions and, with an exception
noted below, take no notice of the effect of the statute. International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union v. Donnelly Garment Co., 147 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1945); Heiser v.
Woodruff, 128 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1942); Covington County v. Stevens, 256 F. 328
(5th Cir. 1919); In re Farmers' Union Mercantile Co., 26 F.2d 102 (E.D.S.C. 1928);
Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood County, 25 F. Supp. 419 (W.D.S.C. 1938).
In Salvage Process Corp. v. Acme Tank Cleaning Process Corp., 104 F.2d 105 (2d
Cir. 1939) the panel headed by Judge Swan followed the "federal rule," based on Oelrichs, taking note of the statutory change, but saying that the statutory language would
be interpreted in the same way that the language of the bond had been interpreted in
Oelrichs. This overlooked the Supreme Court's own statement in Russell v. Farley, 105
U.S. 433 (1881), that different results might be obtained on injunction bonds where
they were entered into pursuant to statutes. In 1972 the Third Circuit, in a closely
reasoned opinion, suggested that Oelrichs had been misinterpreted (on slightly different
grounds than those mentioned here) and questioned its authority. United States Steel
Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923 (1972).
180. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Ware, 74 Tex. 47, 11 S.W. 918 (1889).
181. Stringfield v. Hirsch, 94 Tenn. 425, 29 S.W. 609 (1895).
182. Wood v. State, 66 Md. 61, 5 A. 476 (1886).
183. Wisecarver v. Wisecarver, 97 Va. 452, 34 S.E. 56 (1899).
184. Barrett v. Bowers, 87 Me. 185, 32 A. 871 (1895).
185. Sensenig v. Parry, 113 Pa. 115, 5 A. 11 (1886).
186. Hyman v. Devereux, 65 N.C. 588 (1871).
187. The 1868 Code of Civil Procedure provided for typical cost recoveries-such
items as official fees-but also added a set of fixed charges graduated according to the
legal work done and length of trial. These were obviously intended for partial compensation of the attorneys. See, e.g., N.C. CoDE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 279(2), (7).
188. Ch. 139, § 16, [1871] N.C. Sess. Laws 203, repealed the entire scheme. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-305 (Supp. 1973) provides for uniform costs not including these fees.
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founded on the statute, has come to have a life of its own.1 80
Thus the one-time rule in federal courts, in Texas, and in a group
of six Eastern Seaboard states, has been opposed to a recovery of any
attorneys' fees on the bond. On the other hand, the effect of statutory
changes in both the federal system and in the states, has not yet been
clearly adjudicated, and it is conceivable that some or all of these jurisdictions might, under the aegis of a new statute, reach a different re1 90

sult.

(c) Restitution recoveries. (i) General rule. (A) Recovery of
plaintiff's gains. Where the plaintiff recovers something from the
defendant in a judicial procedure, but it is later determined in the
same proceeding that the first judgment or decree was erroneous, the
plaintiff must return the benefits he gained by the erroneous decree.
This restitutionary claim is based upon gains to the plaintiff, not upon
losses to the defendant, though of course the gains on one side may
well match the losses on the other. The principle of restitution applies
to all kinds of cases, not merely to injunction or provisional remedy
cases. If the plaintiff has gained something that belongs-in law or
equity-to the defendant, he must restore it."0 1 For example, if the
plaintiff sues at law in ejectment to recover Blackacre, he may gain possession by the judgment of the trial court. Yet on appeal, if this judgment is reversed, the plaintiff will be obliged to make restitution of
Blackacre to the defendant, not because the plaintiff is a wrongdoer,
but because he has something that belongs to the defendant.
(B) Effect of bond limits; permanent injunctions. Since the
principle of restitution is to force disgorgement of unjustly held gains,
restitution is not dependent upon an injunction bond. It applies to
permanent injunctions later reversed as well as to provisional orders.
In addition, if there is a bond, the bond's limits do not furnish limits of
the plaintiff's liability. In other words, it may be appropriate in cases
where the plaintiff has gained nothing to limit his liability for the defendant's losses to the amount of the bond. But where the plaintiff
Only limited fees are provided for by general statutes under N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 6-21.1,
.2 (1969).
189. Midgett v. Vann, 158 N.C. 128, 73 S.E. 801 (1912). Although the old compensation system had been repealed in 1871, the court found the repeal of the statute
to be grounds for denying fee recovery, whereas the existence of the statute had been
the basis for the rule in the first place. Hyman v. Devereux, 65 N.C. 588 (1871).
190. Cf. Artistic Hairdressers, Inc. v. Levy, 87 Nev. 313, 486 P.2d 482 (1971)
where Nevada, though it adopted federal rule 65, refused to follow the federal case law
on the attorneys' fees issue.
191. REsTATEMENT oF REsrrTIION § 74 (1937).
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has gained something to which he is not entitled, he is obliged to disgorge that "something" without regard to the bond limits. 9 '
(C) Scope. Perhaps the most frequent application of this rule
in injunction cases occurs in rate-making cases. The pattern is this:
a rate or tariff is set by an administrative agency limiting the amount
a regulated industry can charge for its service-for example, limiting
a railroad's charges for shipping certain goods. The railroads obtain
an injunction against enforcement of the limit and, because of the injunction, are permitted to collect the older and more favorable rates.
After final hearings, it is determined that the regulation is valid so that
it is now apparent that the railroads collected overcharges. With a
variety of regulated industries, it is held that the overcharges must be
refunded, in the absence of some contrary equity or some reason to
leave the matter to administrative regulation. 193
The principle, of course, is not limited to such facts. For example, in one case, the plaintiff was able to obtain an injunction that
had the effect of forcing the defendant to pay the plaintiff royalties for
the use of certain machines. Though the defendant could have used no
machines at all, business practicality forced it to use some machines, and
the injunction forced it to use those of the plaintiff if it used any at all.
When it turned out that the injunction was erroneous, the defendant
was allowed to recover the royalties so paid. 94
The benefits gained by the plaintiff need not be tangible nor repayable in kind. In Bedell Co. v. Harris,9 5 the plaintiff secured a preliminary injunction that allowed him to keep possession of Blackaore
against the claims of defendant, his landlord. The injunction was ultimately dissolved, and of course the plaintiff was obliged to restore
Blackacre to the landlord. But he was also obliged to pay for the
value of Blackacre's use. This is also regarded as restitution. The injunction plaintiff got the value of the use of the property, and the defendant was deprived of that value. So long as we measure "value"
in these cases objectively, by the rental market, we can see that the
plaintiff's gains and the defendant's losses are coincident. It is conceivable, however, that a particular plaintiff might profit in some unusual way so that his personal gains are not reflected by rental value.
192. Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 249 U.S. 134 (1919).
193. See id.; Middlewest Motor Freight Bureau v. United States, 433 F.2d 212 (8th
Cir. 1970).
194. See Hartford-Empire Co. v. Shawkee Mfg. Co., 163 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1947).
195. 228 App. Div. 529, 240 N.Y.S. 550 (1930).
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Likewise, a particular defendant might have special needs for the property and losses from its dispossession that would not be reflected in
mere rental value. There may be special cases where such subjective
measures of damages or restitution would be warranted, but in general
the value of the use of property 90 or money197 is measured objectively,
by the market, not by the special value to the particular parties. That
being so, the use value recovery can ordinarily be treated as a simple
restitution recovery, and hence not limited by the bond limits.
(ii) Limits. (A) Recognizable benefits and legal policy. The
rule permitting restitution without regard to bond limits is subject to
careful limits. In the first place, it may be reiterated that damages to
the defendant are not the same as gains to the plaintiff. If there is
no bond, the defendant cannot collect any damages at all, except so far
as his damages may coincide with gains to the plaintiff. In Tenth Ward
Road District No. 22 v. Texas & Pacific Railway,9 8 a railroad obtained
a provisional injunction against the collection of taxes that would have
gone to secure a bond issue for roadbuilding. When the injunction
was issued, all the building plans collapsed for want of financing. Later
the injunction was dissolved because the taxes were held constitutional,
but by the time the new arrangements could be made for the project,
prices had increased by $26,000. Since there was no bond up, the
local taxing unit sought to recover "restitution" from the railroad. It
was apparent that, though the local unit was damaged, the railroads
had no monetary gains resulting from the injunction. 9 9 Thus there
could be no recovery at all.
Actually in the Tenth Ward case there was one kind of gain: the
railroad gained the opportunity to litigate in circumstances favorable to
itself. Sometimes opportunities are themselves items of gain, or at least
form an element of value in a gain, where the opportunity is bought
and sold.20 0 But if so, it would be unwise to force "restitution" of the
196. See, e.g., DOBBS §§ 5.8, .9.

197. Interest, as such, is always objectively measured; this is what distinguishes it
from profits, which might vary according to the individual using the money. See generally id. § 3.5.
198. 12 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1926).
199. No doubt the interest saved by the railroads by not having to pay immediate
taxes could properly be treated as a restitution item, but it does not seem to have been
claimed here.
200. Similarly, if an employer is forced to pay restitution based on the reasonable
value of a salesman's time, even though the salesman was never able to sell anything,
it can only be said that the employer was paying for an opportunity, not a tangible benefit. See DonBs § 13.3. Even such items as rental value are objective manifestations
of a supposed opportunity to profit. All these things are bought and sold and have an
established market value.
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value of the opportunity to litigate, even if that value could be measured. Perhaps this can be generalized more broadly: restitution here
ought to be limited to "balance sheet" restitution, increases in the values
in the hands of the plaintiff as a result of the provisional order. Though
the cases have not expressed the idea in these terms, they seem to be
consistent with it, and in any event show no signs of using restitution
theory as a fictional base for an award of damages beyond the bond

limits.
(B) Coincidence of defendant's loss with plaintiffs gain. There
is a general, if often vague, notion in the field of restitution generally
that restitution is usually to be granted only when the gains on one side
coincide with losses on the other. 20 1 This is a somewhat treacherous
idea because it depends very much upon assumptions about appropriate
measures of restitution. In the case of ,the tenant who was allowed to
remain in possession of Blackacre after his term expired, it was said
that the landlord's loss and the tenant's gain were equal, because one
gained and one lost the "rental value" of the premises during the period of the erroneous injunction. But the adoption of such an objective
or "general" measure of gain and loss is a method of saying that we
ignore special gains of the plaintiff or special losses of the defendant.
In other words, the gain on one side is equal to the loss on the other
simply because we adopt a measure of gain and loss that makes them
equal, not because they are equal on the parties' respective balance
sheets. Thus if the restitution claimant uses a general measure of damages and matches that with a general measure of restitution, the coincidence of gain and loss can be found readily. Only if the restitution
claimant seeks special restitution (analogous to special damages) will
he have to establish the coincidence of his own loss and his adversary's
profit or gain.
This caution out of the way, it may be said that several major
cases have been interpreted as establishing the coincidence rule in these
injunction cases: the injunction defendant may recover in excess of
the bond only to the extent that he shows his loss coincides with the
plaintiff's gain.20 2 Subject to the caution already given, the proposition
seems entirely correct if we imagine a windfall gain situation in which
the injunction permits the plaintiff to make profits of 10,000 dollars,
201. RESTATEMENT OF REsTITUTIoN § 1, comment e at 14-15 (1937).
202. See Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 107 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 667 (1940); United Motors Serv., Inc. v. Tropic-Aire, Inc., 57
F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1932).
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but costs the defendant only 500 dollars to comply with. For instance,
A obtains an injunction against B to prevent B's breach of a contract,
Compliance with the injunctive order may cost B very little, but may
yield a great profit to A because of other business arrangements he has.
A number of variations can readily be imagined. If it turns out that
the injunctive order was erroneous (because, for example, there was no
valid contract between A and B) B undoubtedly ought to recover his
damages-his cost of compliance with the order, and any other element
of loss. But it seems -to serve no purpose to say that B may also recover the 10,000 dollars profits A was able to make because he had
B's performance. Unless A is a wrongdoer and obtained the injunctive
order in bad faith, the only apparent purpose would be to give B a windfall gain or to deter A from seeking injunctive relief. Though the bond
rules normally intend to force persons like A to pay for the harm their
premature claims cause, there is no reason to impose added liability.
Actually, the circumstances are rather happy ones when we have such
gains. The economic waste that would have been incurred if no injunction issued is avoided (A made a profit that would otherwise be lost)
and B's damages can easily be paid. Though in the end the injunction
proved erroneous, it served to maximize the total economic condition
of the community rather than to cause loss, and there is no reason to
take the gain from one innocent person and give it to another. In addition, the gain does not result solely from injunction. It is
true that the profits here, by hypothesis, would have been lost if the
injunction had not issued. Yet when the profits are saved, their source
lies in part in A's skill, management, and operation of his business. To
B, the 10,000 dollars would be a windfall; to A it would be, in part,
a result of his enterprise.
The cases are not clear, but-subject to the caution already given
-they would probably deny any restitution not coincident with the loss
of the injunction defendant, and this seems entirely correct.
(C) Derivation and direct derivation of gains from losses. Although there is no point in forcing "restitution" of the plaintiff's gains
where there are no damages to the defendant, it does not follow that restitution should be denied merely because the gains of the plaintiff are
not directly traceable to the losses of the defendant.
In -the example given above, A enjoined breach of a contract by B
and was fus enabled to profit 10,000 dollars. B, on the other hand,
was damaged only 500 dollars. Suppose that this damage resulted because B retained an attorney to defend the preliminary injunotion suit
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and to get it dissolved, and that the sum mentioned was the fee of the
attorney. It cannot be said that B's payment of the attorney's fee is in
any way identifiable with the profit made by A. A would have obtained the injunction even if the defense attorney had not been hired.
Thus we have a loss on one side (the 500 dollars) and a gain on the
other (the 10,000 dollars profit), but while they are coincident to the
extent of 500 dollars, they are not causally related or identifiable with
one another. Suppose on these facts that A has not. posted a bond or
that the bond is inadequate. Can B recover 500 dollars? Since there
is coincidence of gain and loss to the extent of 500 dollars, the coincidence requirement is met sufficiently to permit recovery. The only
issue is whether the gain to A must not only be coincident with but also
causally related to the loss by B-that is, somehow derived from B's
loss and not merely derived from the injunctive order itself.
As a matter of sound legal policy there seems no reason to require
identification of gains and losses. If, as the result of an erroneous injunctive order, -the defendant really has provable damages and the
plaintiff really has provable gains, why should not the plaintiff be
obliged to make restitution out of his gains, up to the extent -of the defendant's actual damages? This would not seem to place an undue
inhibition upon access to courts since the plaintiff would still have profited by his appeal to judicial authority. There seems no reason to insist upon the bond limit on recovery in such a case.
The decisions are ambiguous and cloudy, but they may suggest
an answer different from the one just given. They may suggest not only
that restitution will be denied unless the plaintiff's gains are traceable
to and identifiable with the defendant's losses, but also that the gains
must be directly traceable. In Greenwood County v. Duke Power
Co.,20 3 a South Carolina county borrowed money to erect a power
plant. Allegedly it had contracts with certain customers for the sale
of power. Duke, a would-be competitor, obtained injunctive orders
forbidding erection of the plant. After several years' litigation, these
orders were dissolved. Duke had put up no bond, and its only liability
therefore would be to make restitution of any gains it had received as
a result of the injunctive orders. The county alleged that there had indeed been gains: Duke, it said, had profited some $250,000 by reason
of sales to customers who had contracted to buy from the county, and
who presumably would have bought from the county had Dulce not ob203. 107 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1939).
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tained the erroneous injunction. By the same token, the county was
unable to sell power to those customers.
On this statement of the situation, it appears that Duke had gained
and the plaintiff had lost the same thing-certain identifiable purchases
by certain identifiable customers. Yet restitution was denied. At least
two interpretations might be made of the jurists' language. First, the
county had not proved losses adequately, because the amount it would
have profited from the sales might well have been different from the
amount Duke would and did profit; the coincidence of gain and loss
was therefore not proved, at least not as to the amount. Secondly,
Duke profited, but its profits, though coincident with some of the
county's losses, and to some extent traceable to those losses, did not result directly from those losses, .but instead came indirectly, by sales to
the county's would-be customers. Another case, on which the Greenwood court relied, seems to have this second interpretation more clearly
in mind. °4
The second interpretation seems to represent a three-fold rule:
first, gains by one party must coincide with losses by the other; second, the gains must not only be traceable to the losses, but third, they
must be directly traceable. If this is the correct interpretation of the
decisions, it must be said that they are extremely cautious. If there is
no need to identify gain and loss with one another, there should certainly be no need to show a direct passage of benefit from the hands of
the injunction defendant to the injunction plaintiff. If the benefit is
real and measurable with reasonable certainty and the loss is real and
measurable with reasonable certainty, and the injunction was indeed an
erroneous one, the victim of that injunction should be permitted to
recover. It is difficult to be sure of the interpretation of these cases;
but it is clear that they embrace no reckless tendency to impose liabilities upon the injunction plaintiff. If anything they seem to show that
even local governments can be seriously harmed by injunctive orders
where no bonds are posted.
(d) Cumulating restitution and damages. Rule 65 requires a
bond for "costs and damages," but says nothing about restitution. If
the term "damages" is taken literally, the surety's liability would be
limited to the losses suffered by the injunction defendant and the surety
would not be liable for restitution based upon gains to the in-unction
plaintiff in the absence of a bond provision to the contrary. However,
ZQ4. United Motors Srv., Inc. v. Tropic-Aire, Inc., 57 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1932),
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the surety is not excused for this reason from liability for damages as
such, even though those damages to the defendant may be matched by
gains to the plaintiff. Suppose for example the plaintiff posts a bond
in the sum of 5,000 dollars and obtains an injunction later determined
to be erroneous. Suppose the plaintiff has gained and the defendant
has lost 10,000 dollars as a result of the injunction, but that the plaintiff is not able to make restitution of more than 5,000 dollars. In such
a case the defendant could claim 5,000 dollars in damages against the
surety, since he has losses in excess of that amount. He could claim the
balance due from the plaintiff as restitution, since the plaintiff indeed
has gains exceeding the claim.20 5 As to the surety, the claim is no less
a "damages" claim merely because as against the plaintiff it is also one
for restitution; as to the plaintiff, the claim is no less a restitution claim
merely because it is matched by damages to the defendant.
There seems no reason not to cumulate damages and restitution
against the plaintiff individually so long as the cumulative recovery
does not exceed the defendant's actual loss. For example, suppose a
provisional order requires the defendant to turn over 10,000 dollars in
royalties to the plaintiff, and that the defendant incurs attorneys' fees of
5,000 dollars in seeking dissolution of the order. Suppose the bond is
only for 5,000 dollars. It seems reasonable to allow the defendant,
when the order is dissolved, to recover 5,000 dollars from the surety
as damages and 10,000 dollars from the plaintiff as restitution. The
total recovery in such a case exceeds the gains of the plaintiff, but it
does not exceed the total of gains plus the bond. Since liability for
restitution is independent of the bond in the first place, this seems correct.
(e) The problem of the partially erroneous injunctive order.
Sometimes an injunction is partially erroneous and partially correct.
For instance, a chancellor might temporarily enjoin cutting of timber
claimed by the plaintiff. There is a good chance, if the dispute between the parties is a boundary dispute, that the defendant was properly enjoined as to some portions of the land, but improperly enjoined
as to others. In this kind of situation state courts have usually said that
damages are to be assessed upon dissolution of the injunctive order. 208
Of course there is damage only insofar as the order is erroneous. A
205. This was allowed in Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Sw. Ry., 249 U.S.
134 (1919).
206. See Davis v. Champion Fibre Co., 175 N.C. 25, 94 S.E. 671 (1917); Clem
v. Hunz, 132 Wash. 14, 231 P. 7 (1924); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 990 (1926).
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Supreme Court decision, antedating the bond statutes and rule 65, held
that in such a situation the chancellor might refuse, in his discretion, to
grant damages.2-07 Whether such a decision is still sound after the
advent of rule 65 is in doubt. In any event a number of state courts
proceed to award damages. The argument against this is that where
the plaintiff was at least partially correct, he should not stand liable
for damages, even though the damages are limited to harm caused by
the incorrect portion of the order. But if someone must bear the loss
caused by a hastily heard petition-and someone must-why should
it not be borne by the person who institutes that petition? Perhaps the
answer ought to be different if the defendant acts in bad faith or if he
can avoid injury, but otherwise it would seem that the courts have
been correct in assessing damages for partially erroneous orders. In
other words, liability here is no indication of undue liberality in assessing injunction damages.
(f) Liability to third persons. Injunctive orders have considerable capacity for affecting large numbers of people who are not parties
to the litigation. Broadly speaking there are two patterns. First, there
is the third person who is bound by the injunctive order, even though
he is not named as a party. There are not many such cases, but there
are some: one is bound who is in privity with those enjoined, or who
acts as agent for those enjoined, or who aids or abets those enjoined. 0 8
An aider or abetter may be bound by the injunction even though he
has reasons for acting quite independent of any desire to aid the injunction defendant in violating the injunction. Clearly enough, a third person who obeys a provisional injunctive order may be harmed in just the
same way that the injunctive defendant may be harmed. For instance,
if an employer is enjoined from selling frigits, on the ground that they
infringe a trade-mark, the employer's salesman cannot sell the frigits,
either. If he is selling on commission, he will be damaged by an erroneous injunction.
Second, a third person may not be bound by the injunctive order,
but he may be affected in practical ways to his detriment. There are a
number of cases, for example, in which government disbursements have
been enjoined, and the result is that contractors or borrowers or others
dealing with the government may suffer considerable damage.200 In
207. Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433 (1882).
208. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183, 249-60 (1971).
209. A county contracted with the government to borrow money to build a power
plant, but the government was enjoined from disbursing the loan and the county's project
was delayed three years while litigation proceeded. Greenwood County v. Duke Power

19741

PROVISIONAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

1145

such cases the government itself may suffer no harm at all, 'but its contractors, who are not always parties, may suffer overwhelming harm.
Presumably in many of these cases the third person can, if he is
knowledgable enough, intervene in the injunction suit and make himself a party. If he does that, he is presumably a beneficiary of any bond
required of the plaintiff. But the third person cannot always intervene.
He cannot do so at all in the case of ex parte orders. He may accrue
signal damage before he is able to intervene even in the case of preliminary injunctions, and he may in any event fail to realize that becoming a party is significant on the issue of bond coverage.
The question thus arises whether the injunction plaintiff who posts
a bond is liable and whether his surety is liable to third persons who
are not parties in the action. The answer ordinarily depends on the
rule or statute. The Missouri rule provides for a bond to indemnify
both "ithe parties enjoined [and] any party interested in the subject matter of the controversy"-apparently meaning to protect both parties
and third persons. 210 The original Field Code provision was narrower
and spoke only of indemnity "to the party enjoined," ' so that statutes
modeled on that provision-California, for example 212--apparently afford no protection to third persons. The federal rule and its state
counterparts provide only for indemnity for "costs and damages . . .
incurred or suffered by any party"21 3 with the seeming result that only
parties, not third persons, are protected by the bond.
Of course rule 65 does not by its terms prevent the trial judge from
ordering a more protective bond as a condition to the grant of relief if
he sees fit. This has in fact been done in at least one case,214 but such
an action is extremely uncommon, and in the absence of such a special
order, there seems to be no liability to third persons. Thus if the federal rule is taken literally, injury to third persons will routinely go uncompensated.
Co., 107 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 667 (1940). Alternatively,
a contractor is awarded a valuable government contract, but is delayed in carrying it
out, to great damage, because a competitor obtains an erroneous injunctive order. Page
Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
210. Mo. Cr. R. 92.09. The rule uses the term "party" in both clauses, but in the
second clause it seems clear that it covers persons who are not enjoined and apparently,
therefore, persons who are not "parties" to the suit.
211. New York Code of Procedure, cli. 379, § 195, [1848] Laws of New York 534.
212. CAL. Civ. PRo. CoDE § 529 (West 1954).
213. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c); e.g., N.C.R. Civ. P. 65(c).
214. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483 (3d -Cir.), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 923 (1972).
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(g) Extent of liability: conclusion. The courts have been cautious rather than liberal about recoveries on injunction bonds-in some
respects more cautious than seems warranted. In a number of cases no
bond has been required and considerable damage to public or private
interests has gone uncompensated. In others, the bond was entirely
too small, with the result that, though some harm was compensated,
much was not. The individual injunction plaintiff is not personally
liable beyond the amount of the bond, except where he is guilty of bad
faith or must make restitution of benefits received. On the whole
such damages as are awarded are measured sparingly, and some courts
still maintain that even proven damages may be denied in discretion.
So far as damages are a factor in determining whether the bond
should be mandatory, the indication seems to be that a mandatory
bond would hardly unleash a torrent of liability. Indeed, the indication is that either a bond ought to be mandatory or that personal liability beyond the bond limits ought to be imposed as a condition for
extraordinary, often unfair, and often unneeded ex parte relief.
4. The Basis of Liability. (a) Generally. Granted that the
injunction defendant has provable damages resulting from a provisional
injunctive order, what are the substantive elements of his claim and
the standards by which liability is established or denied?
Most jurisdictions employ one of two types of statutes. One, basically derived from the 1848 New York Code, provides for liability on
the bond when "it is finally decided that the injunction ought not to have
been issued," or that the "plaintiff was not entitled thereto. '' 215 The
other basic statutory provision is the federal rule type. It provides for
liability when it is shown that the defendant was "wrongfully enjoined
or restrained."2 16 A handful of states call for damages when the pro21
visional order is "dissolved. 7
215. Arkansas, California, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New
York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina and South Dakota all appear to
have similarly worded statutes in this respect. Oregon's statute speaks of damages "by
reason of the injunction if the same be wrongful or without sufficient cause." Connecticut's statute speaks of liability where the "plaintiff . . .fails to prosecute the action
to effect .... ." See Appendix I.
216. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Rhode Island and Tennessee have this type of bond statute. Hawaii adopted a rule similar to the federal rule, but for some reason left out all of the language that might bear
on the basis of liability, perhaps because the terms of the bond were left to the trial
judge's discretion. See Appendix I.
217. Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri and Texas follow this pattern. See Appendix
L
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None of these provisions, however, spells out the criteria by which
liability is to be judged. Decisions have made it clear enough that bad
faith is not required to establish liability, even under a "wrongfully enjoined" statute, though bad faith on the part of the plaintiff may establish grounds for a malicious prosecution action against him."'
Most of the courts that have considered the topic seem agreed that
there may also be liability when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses his
own suit,210 but that there is no such liability when the dismissal results from an agreement of both parties. 220 But beyond these rather
elementary points, the standards for determining whether the injunction plaintiff is liable at all have received almost no clear statement.
The cases are not very clear about either the issues or the answers. Most discussions have been directed to the appropriate timing
for assessing liability rather than to the appropriate standards for doing
so. Perhaps the simplest way to approach the problem is to identify
two basic possibilities, each of which may pose variations. One possiblity is that liability on the bond is determined solely by the ultimate
merits. Regardless how circumstances appeared when the provisional
order was issued, the plaintiff would be liable if he lost in the ultimate
decision on the merits, and he would be relieved of liability if he won.
The other basic possibility is that liability is determined solely by preliminary merits. The plaintiff under this view would be liable if the
preliminary injunction was erroneous on the basis of evidence adduced
at the time, even if a final decision on the merits went in his favor; by
the same token he would be relieved of liability if the preliminary order
was correct as of the time it was issued, even though he ultimately lost.
A combination of these rules is also possible, for instance, a rule that
imposes liability if either preliminary error or ultimate error is demonstrated.
218. See Note, 73 HARV. L. REV., supra note 12, at 342. The cases most commonly
say that, in the absence of a bond, bad faith on the plaintiff's part is necessary to establish liability, e.g., Tenth Ward Rd. Dist. No. 11 v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 12 F.2d 245 (5th
Cir. 1926). They likewise imply the same result where recovery is allowed without any
mention of bad faith by the plaintiff. North Carolina originally adopted a different
rule, but the statute was amended to accord with the textual statement above. See
Burnett v. Nicholson, 79 N.C. 548 (1878); Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 251, [1893] N.C.
Sess. Laws 206. There is some general authority, however, to the effect that the trial
judge may at his discretion excuse liability where the plaintiff acts in good faith and
other factors seem to warrant such excuse. See, e.g., Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc.
v. Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
219. E.g., Nansemond Timber Co. v. Rountree, 122 N.C. 45, 29 S.E. 61 (1898).
220. See M. Blatt Co. v. Southwell, 259 N.C. 468, 130 S.E.2d 859 (1963); Large
v. Steer, 121 Pa. 30, 15 A. 490 (1888).
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(b) Propriety of relief on final hearing as controlling. (i) No
liability if plaintiff prevails on final hearing. It seems to be commonly
assumed in the cases that if the injunction defendant loses on the merits

on a final decision, he is not entitled to recover on the bond, even if the
preliminary injunction was erroneous on the facts shown at the time it
was issued.221 For instance, in Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco
Railway,11 a railroad obtained a provisional injunctive order against

various officials of Oklahoma, the effect of which was to prohibit any
state hearing on a proposed move by the railroad and to permit the rail-

road to proceed with its planned move. The matter had been pending,
by the railroad's own pleadings, for ten years or so without any effort
by the railroad to proceed, and the Supreme Court concluded that no

irreparable injury to the railroad had been shown. For this reason it
reversed that provisional injunction. Eventually, however, a permanent
injunction was granted, so that the railroad's position on the merits was
vindicated, even though it had been palpably wrong in seeking purely

provisional relief.

There was another appeal to the Supreme Court,

which held that the trial court could in its discretion refuse to assess
damages on the bond in the light of the ultimate decision on the mer22 3
its.
A North Carolina case seems to embody the same idea. In
Thompson v. McNair2 2 4 the plaintiff sought and got a provisional injunction to preserve turpentine lands from defendant's alleged depredations while a legal action was pending to resolve the claims of the respective parties. The injunctive order was later dissolved because the
221. See Powers v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 42 Del. 577, 41 A.2d 830 (1945); Rose
v. Martin, 308 Ky. 661, 215 S.W.2d 579 (1948). The cases are often decided, like
these, on the ground that the claim on the bond is premature, even though the provisional injunction has been dissolved. The reasoning is that an appeal or other decision
may still vindicate the injunction plaintiff, even though it has already been determined
that preliminary relief was erroneous. It is possible to construe such cases as determining only a point about ripeness, but it seems more probable that they are based upon
the view that the liability is determined by who wins on the ultimate merits.
222. 274 U.S. 588 (1927).
223. Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 278 U.S. 228 (1929). This is not
a decision that damages could not be awarded, but only that damages need not be
awarded. Justice Brandeis said: "Although [the trial court] required the bond, and this
court held that the interlocutory injunction had been improvidently issued, the District
Court could, in its discretion, refuse to assess the damages until it should, after the final
hearing, have determined whether the plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction
. :* *It might then refuse to allow recovery of any damages, even if the permanent
injunction should be denied." Id. at 233. For this last proposition the Court cited Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433 (1881)-a case leaving damages assessment on bonds in
certain circumstances to the trial judge's discretion.
224. 64N.C. 448 (1870).
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plaintiff had not shown that irreparable harm would result in its absence. At this point the defendant sought to recover on the bond for
damages caused by the injunctive order. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina, however, refused to permit recovery of damages, saying that
the action at law must first determine the ultimate merits of the case.
The reasoning very plainly indicated that the defendant could not recover merely because the provisional order was erroneously issued, unless it also turned out that the defendant's position was correct on the
merits. Other cases are in accord.2 25
The variations on this basic position might be extensive. For
instance in the Lawrence case the Supreme Court of the United States
only went so far as to leave damages to the discretion of the trial court,
but the North Carolina Supreme Court in Thompson seems to have
laid down a rule of law rather than a rule of discretion. It is also possible to imagine that results might be different if the preliminary error
were different or if the ultimate decision were on some procedural
ground rather than on the substantive merits of the case. But the
cases simply have not given the matter that much analysis.
(ii) Liability if plaintiff does not prevail on final hearing. It is
probably the prevailing assumption-"rule" seems too strong a word
for such inarticulate and unanalyzed ideas-that the plaintiff escapes
liability if he ultimately wins, at least if he wins on the merits. The
assumptions about the converse situation are not so clear. What if the
plaintiff ultimately loses on the merits of the decision, but can demonstrate that the preliminary injunction was correct on the basis of facts
and arguments presented to the trial judge when the preliminary injunction was issued? Although authority on this point is sparse, it
would seem -that liability should be imposed here. The very purpose
of the bond is to require that the plaintiff assume the risk of paying
damages he causes as the "price" he must pay to have the extraordinary
privilege of provisional relief. The fact that the plaintiff's position
seemed sound when it was presented on the ex parte or preliminary
hearing is no basis for relieving him of liability, since the very risk that
requires a bond is the risk of error because such hearings are attenuated and inadequate. To say that proof at the inadequate hearing,
against which the bond is intended to protect, relieves of liability on
the bond is merely to subvert the bond's purpose. Thus the few cases
that seem to deal with this situation seem correct in assessing liability
225. E.g., Raleigh & W. Ry. v. Glendon & Gulf Mining & Mfg. Co., 117 N.C. 191,
23 S.E. 181 (1895).
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to the plaintiff who loses on the ultimate merits, even when his proof
warranted preliminary relief at the time it was awarded. 228 But some
courts apparently would retain the doctrine that damages may be denied
in the trial judge's discretion even where a bond had been posted. In
such courts the result may be to protect the plaintiff if he wins on the
merits because the ultimate merits are controlling, while at the same
time to protect him through discretion if he loses on the merits, on the
ground that he had a good claim for provisional relief.22T

Where this

view is taken, the plaintiff is insulated from liability, and the defendant
is left with the resulting ruins.
It is possible to mount reasonable arguments that the rules ought
to be more protective to the defendant who is trapped into an attenuated
trial on a preliminary injunction, and that he should recover not only
when he wins on the ultimate merits, but also where, though he loses
on the ultimate merits, he is erroneously subjected to a provisional order.
First, damages sustained in defending against an erroneous provisional order may reduce the funds the defendant has available for
defending himself on the merits. Secondly, provisional relief may put
the plaintiff in a better tactical position to sustain his position on final
hearing. In the Lawrence case, 228 the railroad, by procuring an erroneous interlocutory order was permitted to move its shipping facilities
in spite of an Oklahoma regulatory order. The interlocutory injunction was reversed, but by that time the move had been completed at
a cost of 150,000 dollars. The railroad's legal position on the final
hearing would have to be weak indeed if a judge would feel compelled
to force the railroad to move back its shipping facilities at a similar
cost. Perhaps it is even more clear that a preliminary order may give
the plaintiff a bargaining position to which he is not entitled. The employer who procures a preliminary injunction against a strike usually
226. See, e.g., Atomic Oil Co. v. Bardahl Oil Co., 419 F.2d 1097 (10th Cir. 1970).
The court said in part: "Judicial determination of the bonds' applicable condition must
probe the merits of the right to injunctive relief and not merely the trial court's discretion in providing temporary protective security." Id. at 1102. In Morse Taxi & Baggage
Transfer v. Bel Harbour Village, 242 So. 2d 177 (Fla. App. 1970), the provisional order
was affirmed on appeal, but after full trial, it was dissolved and damages assessed. The
court held that affirmance of the provisional order showed it was proper at the time,
but that the test was the ultimate merits, not the merits as they appeared when the order
was issued.
227. E.g., Page Communications Eng'rs, Inc. v. Froehlke, 475 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
228. Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 274 U.S. 588 (1927); see notes 20001 supra.
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breaks the strike. The strike broken, his interest in negotiation or even
a final hearing on the merits, is apt to lag. What is preliminary relief
de lure is final relief de facto.
In the third place, provisional relief should be discouraged. A
plaintiff who seeks such relief can be viewed as seeking an extraordinary privilege the price of which is a guarantee that the privilege is indeed justified by the facts of the case.
In the fourth place, there might be additional justifications for
awarding damages in special situations. For instance, a plaintiff might
have a good substantive claim for which he ultimately recovers an
award of damages. But this does not necessarily justify the injunctive remedy, even on a final judgment. The plaintiff who has a good
slander claim has a good claim for the damages remedy but seldom if
ever a good claim for an injunction.229 In such a case, the fact that the
plaintiff prevails in the end in the sense that he obtains a damages
award is not necessarily any justification for his use of the injunctive
process at any stage.
But, as is generally the case, the courts have been cautious about
awards on the injunction bond, and only a few cases suggest, even remotely, that the injunction plaintiff should be held for damages resulting from an erroneous interlocutory order where he has won on the ultimate merits.
A Third Circuit decision 230 under the bond provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act 23 1 imposed several unusual liabilities upon plaintiffs
who had obtained a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs obtained a
preliminary injunction that was reversed on first appeal because it was
thought that the trial judge had afforded an inadequate opportunity to
the parties to develop their positions in the case. On remand the preliminary injunction hearing was to be inaugurated de novo, but the
parties, on the day of the hearing, entered into a stipulation that in effect dismissed the case. It is usually said that when the parties stipulate for dismissal, there is no final decision on the merits and the injunction plaintiff cannot be held liable on the bond.232 Nevertheless
229. DOBBS § 7.2.
230. United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 923 (1972).
231. Norrs-LaGuardia Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1970). This provision is similar
to that in rule 65(c), but invokes liability for "any loss, expense, or damage caused by
the improvident or erroneous issuance of such order or injunction," and specifically includes attorney's fees.
232. See cases cited in note 220 supra.
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the injunction plaintiffs were held liable. Since there was no final decision on the merits, nor anything equivalent thereto, the "wrongfulness" of the preliminary injunction must have been found in the procedural error of that injunction itself and not in any ultimate decision
on the merits.
The decision, at least in context, does not seem incautious. The
injunction plaintiffs probably got what they wanted-a broken strike
and a position of advantage from which to bargain. If they indeed got
such advantages by reason of an erroneous provisional order, it does
not seem out of line to award damages caused by that error, even
though we are unsure of the ultimate merits of the dispute.
Although there are a few other cases that might be interpreted as
offering support for liability for injunctive orders,2 3 the overwhelming
conclusion is that courts have not only been cautious in measuring damages and restitution to be awarded, but also have been cautious in recognizing that erroneous orders even call for damages.
B.

PracticalProblems in Structuringa Bond Statute

There are at least two requirements of a good statute making a
bond mandatory. It must be clear in what sense the bond is mandated.
And it must provide a satisfactory practical means of enforcing the requirement. If there is no satisfactory means of enforcement, it must
be doubted whether the bond should be mandated at all.
1.

The Enforcement Problem with MandatoryBonds.

(a) Meanings of "Mandatory." There are several distinct senses
in which one might say that a bond is a mandatory prerequisite to injunction.
First, a bond might be mandatory in the sense that the judge is
told by the statute that he has no discretion to dispense with it (with
233. Jesse French Piano & Organ Co. v. Forbes, 134 Ala. 302, 32 So. 678 (1902)
(under a "dissolution" type statute, recovery may be had when the provisional order is
dissolved, notwithstanding the fact that an appeal is pending that might reinstate the order). Weierhauser v. Cole, 132 Iowa 14, 109 N.W. 301 (1906) is suggestive but no
more. P, intending to construct a rural telephone line, began installing it along the
highway in front of D's house. D threatened to remove this obstruction, and P obtained
a preliminary injunction. It was later determined that this was error and that P had
no right to obstruct D in the absence of condemnation, after which a settlement was
reached. D was allowed to recover nominal damages. Here D actually won on the
merits, and the relevance to the present problem is that D's position was purely technical, since P could have (and later did) achieve the right asserted by condemnation.
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whatever exceptions might be provided). A statute like this would
represent a change in the law in several federal circuits where it is held
that the matter is within the trial judge's discretion. However, this
change would not necessarily entail reversal on interlocutory appeal if
a trial judge failed to require a bond. A bond might be mandatory
in this sense and yet its absence be deemed unprejudicial. Enforcement of the bond requirement under this rule would be effective if the
trial judge were aware of the rule in each case and followed it. Otherwise it would not be effective at all.
Second, a bond might be mandatory in the sense that it is error
to issue an injunctive order until a bond has been provided by the plaintiff. Under this rule, the injunction issued without a bond would be
reversed on interlocutory appeal if such an appeal is available and is
taken.
Third, a bond might be mandatory in the sense that no injunctive
order issued without a bond will be effective at all; such an order would
be not only erroneous, but void. The defendant would be free to disobey the void order.
Fourth, a bond might be mandatory in the sense that some procedural impediment to issuance of the injunctive order literally prevents
issuance without a bond. For instance, a bond might be made a prerequisite to any filing by the clerk and any service of process by the
sheriff.
Fifth, a bond might 'be mandatory in the sense that where no bond
is provided, some other form of liability is automatically invoked. For
instance, the plaintiff might become personally liable, or the clerk might
become liable on his own performance bond, if he accepted papers
without the requisite bond.
(b) Assessment of alternatives. (i) Directive to the judge
and reversible error rules. A bond statute that merely directs the
judge to require a bond, even if it does not provide any sanctions, has
some value because the judge who adverts to the statute will simply
follow it and thus provide for the protection intended. Perhaps in rare
cases he will ignore the requirement, against which possibility it would
be desirable to add a statutory rule that a provisional order not backed
by a bond is reversible. The chief problem with either the simple
"directive" statute or the "reversible error" statute occurs when a TRO
is issued. On the TRO, the absent defendant cannot request a bond,
and the judge may not advert to the statute, or, if he does, he may set
the amount of the bond far too low since he will not have heard the

1154

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Voel. 52

defendant's side of the story. An appeal from the TRO may not be
available at all in many instances, and as a practical matter, even when
appeal is available, the defendant cannot hope to reverse the order before damage not'covered by a bond has been done to him. The directory and reversible error rules, then, do not seem to provide sufficient protection to the defendant.
(ii) The Voidness Rule.

An erroneous judgment or decree is

not void or unenforceable. Such an order or judgment has res judicata
effect and may not be collaterally attacked in a second proceeding. It
must be attacked directly-as by an appeal-or not at all. Furthermore, in the case of an injunctive order, it must be obeyed until it is
reversed or dissolved.23 4 In other words, a defendant who disobeys
an injunctive order is in criminal contempt, and it is no defense to say
28 5
that the order was erroneous.
A void judgment or decree, on the other hand, imports no legal
force at all. It may be attacked not only on appeal, but collaterally;
in other words, it has no res judicata force. Furthermore, it may be
disobeyed with impunity. A defendant who disobeys a void injunctive
order, if cited for contempt, may successfully defend on the ground that
the order was void.23
Some statutes seem to imply that provisional injunctive orders
issued without a bond are not only erroneous but void, and some courts
have clearly so held.237 Such a rule, if literally followed, would mean
that any plaintiff who procured a provisional injunction without posting
a bond would then be highly motivated to comply with the bond requirement, for his own protection. And if he failed to do so, the penalty
to him would be protection for the defendant, who would then be
freed of any compulsion to obey the injunction.
This sounds very much like a scheme that works well on paper
because it postulates knowledge, rationality and simplicity but that
234. See Board of Educ. v. York, 429 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1970); Dobbs, Trial Court
Erroras an Excess of Jurisdiction,43 TEXAS L. REV. 854 (1965).
235. See Rendleman, supra note 64.
236. Id. at 248.
237. In Castleman v. State, 94 Miss. 609, 47 So. 647 (1908), a restraining order
was issued without bond and defendant violated it. He was charged with contempt, but
the court held that in the absence of a bond the order was void and that the defendant
could not be convicted for that reason. A number of cases have arisen in more ambiguous circumstances, for instance on a direct appeal of the order. Some of these cases
say that the injunction issued without bond was void or of no legal effect, but since the
issue arose directly, a statement that it was error would have sufficiently covered the
case. E.g., Hall v. McLuckey, 134 W. Va. 595, 60 S.E.2d 280 (1950).

1974]

PROVISIONAL INJUNCTIVE'RELIEF

1155

works out hardly at all in practice because the postulated qualities are
in short supply. The scheme will not work if the plaintiff (or his lawyer) is unaware of the bond requirement, or if he is unaware of the effect of having no bond. Nor will it work even if the plaintiff is fully
aware of the legal rules if he thinks the defendant or his lawyer is not
aware of them-a fairly high likelihood in the case of a TRO, where
the defendant may be restrained before he can have an opportunity to
consult with an attorney. Nor will it work if the plaintiff is uncertain
of his case and fears liability on the bond, but obtains a provisional
order enjoining the defendant in the mere hope that defendant will obey
it.
On the defendant's side the scheme will not work if he is ignorant
of the legal rules. Nor will it work even if he knows the rules, if there
are complications or doubts about their application. Suppose for instance, a statute makes an injunctive order issued without a bond "absolutely void." It is still possible that some court will say the provision
was inserted for the defendant's benefit and that the defendant may
waive it.238 And it is always possible that the plaintiff could assert
(honestly or otherwise) conduct amounting to a waiver by the defendant. Wise defendants in injunction cases will consider such possibilities,
and if they contemplate disobedience of the order, they will consider
the risk that, in spite of the "voidness" rules, they will nonetheless be
held in contempt. Pragmatically speaking, they may be forced into
compliance without the protection of a bond.
What seems likely is added litigation over collateral issues. For
instance, must the defendant know that the bond was not posted before
his compliance with the decree is excused? What conduct will amount
to a waiver of the rule, if any? If he complies with a "void" order, has
he any claim for damages against the plaintiff who posted no bond on
the ground that failure to do so is in itself evidence of "malice"? Or if
he complies with a "void" order is he the author of his own damages
so that he has no claim at all? And so on.
Even if it seems like a good idea to call for a serious judicial order
and then invite disobedience of it, the practicalities of the voidness rule
do not recommend it very highly as a means of either protecting the
defendant or forcing the plaintiff to claim such relief in extreme cases.
(iii) Procedural guarantees of a bond and personal liability.

The protections of a bond may lie with a combination of procedures to
238. This happened in Oklahoma. In Walbridge-Aldinger Co. v. City of Tulsa, 107
Okla. 259, 233 P. 171 (1924), the Oklahoma court held that an injunctive order without
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guarantee posting of a bond and a rule that imposes personal liability
upon the plaintiff who fails to do so. Taken together these should
maximize the protection to the defendant and at the same time maximize the deterrent to frivolous claims.
The basic mechanism for this approach is a rule that (1) the judge
shall require a bond, (2) the clerk or the sheriff shall refuse any filing, service of process or other official action until a bond has been
provided as approved by the judge, and (3) the plaintiff shall be personally liable for any actual damages to the defendant, including attorneys' fees in a reasonable amount, if no bond is provided.
Probably there can be no catch-all rule, and probably some cases
escape this net. The judge called out in the middle of the night to issue
an ex parte order may well overlook the requirement of a bond. The
plaintiff who obtains such an order may himself notify the defendant
of its existence, so that neither clerk nor sheriff have an opportunity to
require a bond. But even if a case slips through all the procedural requirements, there remains the personal liability of the plaintiff himself.
This may furnish additional motive to the plaintiff to offer up a bond,
and in any event it provides a liability that does not now exist for wrongful injunction in the absence of a bond.
It is possible of course that the plaintiff will not have sufficient
time to procure a bond if his legitimate interests are to be protected.
This is true under any scheme for enforcement of a mandatory bond
requirement, but it may be thought particularly hard to impose an unlimited personal liability upon the plaintiff without limit as a condition
to the injunction. But it must be remembered that the plaintiff is personally liable to indemnify the surety on the bond. The bond limit is
surely not intentionally set lower than the expected actual damages of
the defendant, though it may happen inadvertently. Thus, except for
the accident of a bond limit set entirely too low, the plaintiff in an injunction case will in any event be liable to pay the defendant's damages,
and to remove the arbitrariness of the bond limit as a protection to the
plaintiff does not seem harsh at all. If it is believed otherwise, however, it would be possible to permit the judge to authorize the plaintiff
to limit his liability to an amount set by -the judge, as if the plaintiff
were his own surety.
a bond was void, and that the defendants were free to disregard it. Three months later,
in Allison v. Massey, 108 Okla. 140, 235 P. 192 (1925), the same court said that the
defendant could not even object on direct appeal when no bond was furnished because
he had "waived" the bond requirement by treating the judgment as effective.
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(c) The Enforcement Problem: Conclusion. It may well be
that no mandatory bond requirement will work unless some minimum
amount of penalty is set by statute. It may even be necessary to provide for liquidated damages in a minimum sum if the requirement is
to be effective. But with these qualifications, it seems likely that a
mandatory bond can be enforced in a practical manner if it is thought
to be a desirable requirement in principle.
2. Alternatives to a Fully Mandatory Scheme
(a) Identifying cases for special treatment: Generally, the fully
mandatory system is not satisfactory; neither is the discretionary system.
Is there room for a system of security that mandates a bond in some instances but leaves it to the judge's discretion in others? Two kinds of
cases may seem to warrant special treatment. One is the case in which
no damage to the defendant is likely if the provisional order proves to
be erroneous. The other is the case in which the plaintiff, because of
poverty or unpopularity, cannot obtain the requisite security. In these
two categories of cases relief from the bond requirement might well
be sufficiently well defined to make relief practical. The question,
then, is whether a statutory rule could be provided to eliminate the requirement in identified groups of cases.
(i) No-damages cases. (A) The ad hoc approach. A rule
could be drawn requiring security except where the judge specifically
finds that damages are not likely to result to the defendant if the injunction is erroneous. This is in fact merely a version of the discretionary
approach that now exists, except that it narrows the range of judicial
discretion. But it has all the defects of the discretionary system: it requires adjudication of an issue collateral to the merits at a point in litigation where there is already too little time for proof, argument and
thoughtful decision-making. Furthermore, the judge's decision on this
point is likely to be based on inadequate evidence-the very problem
that makes us want the bond in the first place. The costs of this approach outweigh its benefits. The plaintiff, in the absence of poverty
or similar circumstances, ought to take the risks and costs on this issue
rather than burden the system with collateral and undependable adjudications.
(B) Non-business cases. Would it be possible, then, to identify
groups of cases according to subject matter where damages are unlikely and to remove those cases from the mandate of a bond? Clearly
the routine business and property cases, in which the plaintiff seeks to
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enjoin pollution by a factory, or enjoin the merger of corporations or
the use of trade symbols, are all likely to cause damage to the defendant if the injunction is erroneous. But what of the non-business plaintiff suing the non-business defendant-is this case, too, likely to result
in harm? The answer is that it will at times result in harm, and prediction is not safe. For instance, imagine a neighborhood squabble in
which one neighbor obtains an injunction against the unreasonable
barking by the other neighbor's dog. Though the fight is entirely personal, the enjoined defendant may be forced to board his dog at a kennel until his right can be established-no mean expense. The "nonbusiness" category is thus not a reliable basis for exemption from the
bond requirement.
(C) Civil rights cases. One special kind of non-business case
is the civil rights action, in some respects a favored action and one
which there is very great reluctance to inhibit. But it has already been
pointed out that a civil rights injunction may cause damage-possibly
severe-to both parties and third persons. If picketers obtain a provisional injunction protecting their right to picket a grocer when in fact
their picketing is illegal and not protected, their injunction may well
cause a loss of business to the grocer. 23 9 The same is true if the civil
rights plaintiff asserts that the government must continue to disburse
funds to him or to organizations from which he derives benefits: if
his position is error, it is very likely indeed that that government will
be damaged by the amount of funds paid out under the mandate of a
24 0
provisional injunction.
All civil rights cases are not like this, of course, but some are. It
is therefore impossible to use the category "civil rights" as a test of one's
responsibility to post a bond.
(D) Attacks on statutes and administrative orders. Injunction
suits are often used as the means for attacking the validity of a statute
or reviewing an administrative decision. When the administrator is
enjoined from enforcing the statute or regulation or administrative decision, its validity comes into issue. On the face of it, such cases are
often simply suits between a citizen and the government and damage
does not seem terribly likely. However, damage in fact occurs in a
number of these cases. In a case already mentioned in another con239. See C. Comella, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 33 Ohio App. 2d 61, 292 N.E.2d
647 (1972) where the parties were reversed and the grocer sued to enjoin the picketers.
240. Se Qlover v. McMurr y, 361 F. Supp. 235 (S.D.N,Y. 1973).
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nection, 241 a railroad mounted an attack on a tax statute by enjoining
collection of the taxes. By the time the suit could be disposed of and
the taxes collected, the building costs to which the taxes applied had
risen by 26,000 dollars. Injunctions against administrative decisions
can and do work in the same way. For instance, if a zoning board
grants a variance to A and objecting neighbors obtain an injunction to
prevent A from using his land in accord with the variance, it is clear
that A may have damages. 242 At best, his use of his land at its full
capacity is delayed; building costs may increase as in the railroad case,
or perhaps he may lose profits on whatever building he had planned to
erect. Here again, there are no doubt cases in which one could enjoin
administrative action without risking damage; but the category is not a
sound basis for exemption from the bond requirement, simply because
many of the cases can in fact create damages to the defendant.
(E) Conclusion as to no-damage cases. Though the purchase of
of a bond when it is in fact unnecessary is in one sense a waste of
money, in another it is not. At the moderate cost for commercial
bonds, it is far better economically to force a solvent plaintiff to pay
the bond premium than it is to utilize the time of lawyers and judges
in trying to prove that the bond is needless in particular cases. Since
no reasonably workable category appears to permit a rule of thumb,
it would be better to require security without regard to whether damages are thought likely or not. So long, at least, as the plaintiff does
not assert an inability to post security, it does not seem unreasonable
to put the risks of hasty decision-making on him.
(ii) The poor plaintiff. If it is not practical to eliminate the
bond requirement for specified cases grouped by subject-matter, it is
still possible to afford a special dispensation to those plaintiffs who,
by reason of poverty or otherwise, simply cannot obtain sureties. Quite
apart from the issue of open courts and the injustice of preventing enforcement of rights by such persons, suits of this sort often raise issues
of public importance.
Even if the Constitution does not require a waiver of the bond for
all poor plaintiffs, there are some cases with special appeal. In several
cases plaintiffs have obtained mandatory preliminary injunctions to
241. Tenth Ward Rd. Dist. No. 11 v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 12 F.2d 245 (5th Cir.
1926); see text accompanying notes 198-99 supra.
242. The same is true if review and delay are obtained in a purely administrative appeal, in which case the same kind of bond protection is desirable and sometimes provided
for by statute. See Damaskos v. Board of Appeal, 359 Mass. 59, 267 N.E.2d 897
(1971).
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have their names put on the ballot in an election, even though they
could not pay the regular filing fee. The assertion was that they had
constitutional rights to present themselves as candidates in an election,
provided they were otherwise qualified. The courts agreed and ordered
their names placed on the ballot. 243 Clearly an erroneous provisional
order in such a case will result in damages. The elections board will
probably have printing costs and perhaps extensive administrative expenses if the plaintiff's name must be ultimately removed from the
ballot. Third parties-notably other candidates-may also incur damages as a result of an erroneous provisional order putting the plaintiff's
name on the ballot. Nevertheless, it is particularly appropriate to permit this kind of plaintiff access to provisional orders without posting a
bond if he cannot afford to do so. The special element here is not
merely that he asserts a civil rights claim, but that his poverty is the
very basis for his substantive law claim. What the law's substantive
hand gives, its procedural hand should not take away. In other words
the poverty that vests in him rights to begin with should not be the
basis for denying enforcement of those rights. This is not to say that
provisional relief in such a ease is always warranted,2 44 but only to say
that, if it is, the bond requirements should not prevent access to the
remedy.
Similar to this is the case in which the plaintiff's poverty is not a
necessary element to his substantive-law claim but is a necessary ele2 45
ment in his right to a provisional remedy. In Glover v. McMurray,
the plaintiffs were working people whose children were in day-care
centers. The centers were subsidized by federal funds administered
by a state agency. The state demanded certain items of information
about the parents as a condition to further receipt of the funds. The
parents and the day care centers objected that this was an unwarranted
invasion of their privacy and refused to furnish the information. The
state then threatened to cut off the funds. The plaintiffs sued to require the continued support, and obtained a provisional injunctive order to this end. The plaintiffs' claim, substantively, was that they had
a right to a hearing before the funds were cut off and, additionally,
243. See Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452 (1973); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972).
244. Granted the substantive right, why should one who wants on the ballot wait
until the last minute so as to require a provisional order rather than an orderly, fully
developed trial? On the basis of this question it would be possible to refuse provisional
relief and hence to eliminate the bond problem. It is difficult to escape the impression
that the need for provisional relief can be avoided in many cases.
245. 361 F.Supp. 235 (S.DN.Y, 1973).
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that they had a right of privacy that would be invaded by the information requirement. Neither of these points turned on their financial
status. But their right to provisional rather than final relief probably
did. A wealthy person might simply transfer his child to another center or provide a governess or a baby-sitter. A poor person would be
required to quit his or her job to stay with the child or to make other
equally disruptive adjustments. At the very least, it can be said that
preliminary relief was more plainly required because of the plaintiff's
financial limitations.
How can the poor person's claim be identified by rule? Probably
the answer is that it cannot be identified. If the judge in each case is
left to identify the plaintiff as a poor person and excuse the bond only
when such identification is made, some of the same objections that may
be made to a purely discretionary system can be raised. However, in
cases like those just mentioned, the judge will be compelled to examine
the question of the plaintiff's financial status in any event, either on the
substantive merits or on the issue of proper relief, so that the issue of
poverty will not be collateral to the remainder of his inquiry, but, on
the contrary, will bear directly upon it.
(b)

Special provisions where plaintiff is a poor person.

(i) Private sureties. If a statute authorized the judge to dispense with the bond in suits brought by poor persons who could not
afford bond costs or obtain sureties, what provisions could be made to
protect the defendant injured by an improvident injunctive order and
to insure at least minimal responsibility of the injunction plaintiff? Several possibilities exist.
The easiest response to the plaintiff who says he cannot afford a
bond is to permit him to use private rather than commercial sureties.
This is in fact possible under existing legislation and in some areas the
private surety is used routinely to save bond costs. Poor persons will
naturally have more difficulty in procuring suitable private sureties
than will wealthy corporations, but particularly in cases where the poor
person is engaged in a civil rights claim there are likely to be organizations and groups available to go bond in limited amounts. This is
no panacea, but it is a practical alternative for a great many cases.
The problem of bond costs for poor persons, in other words, may be
resolved in many instances by this simple expedient.
(ii) Bond charges as taxable costs. The financial impact of the
bond cost can be minimized by taxing the premium as an element of
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costs in the case to be awarded to the plaintiff if he ultimately wins.
As a consequence the defendant may, in some instances, wish to waive
the bond or ask that it be set at a lower figure. Thus taxing the bond
premium as an element of cost in the case will reduce the impact upon
the plaintiff in cases where his claim turns out to be a valid one, and
may encourage defendants to accept realistic bond limits.
(iii) State managed funds. The plaintiff who cannot afford the
bond premium and the plaintiff who cannot obtain a corporate surety
because of the unpopularity of his cause might be given access to the
provisional injunction without a bond. The disadvantages of this are
threefold. One is that the defendant would go unprotected and might
suffer considerable losses if the injunction is erroneous. The second
is that the judge might hesitate to grant a needed injunction because
of the lack of protection to the defendant. There is very little of this
attitude appearing in the cases-judges have seemed too little rather
than -too much concerned over proteotion for the defendant-but there
are no doubt cases in which the bond does in fact encourage the judge
to grant a needed order. The third disadvantage is that the plaintiff
himself assumes no responsibility for the rather high risk of potential
harm to the defendant if no bond is posted.
Two of these three objections can be remedied by the provision
for a state-managed fund guaranteeing defendant's compensation in the
event of an erroneous order given to a no bond plaintiff. Such a fund
-generated, perhaps, by a cost item taxed in each suit filed-could
not only protect the innocent defendant, but could encourage the trial
judge to act where action is really needed but the potential for error
or damages seems high. But the use of such a fund, while it would
protect the defendant, would do nothing to force responsibility upon
the plaintiff. If the plaintiff asks the defendant to risk losses because
of an inadequate hearing, the plaintiff ought to bear at least minimal
responsibility for those losses when they in fact occur, and a subsidy
does not impose such responsibility upon the plaintiff.
In addition it may be said that the poor plaintiff is, in spite of
immense civil rights activity in the courts, still a relatively rare plaintiff.
Moderate bonds could be managed by the great majority of litigants,
and the erection of a state managed fund is probably a public cost out
of proportion to the need.
(c) Personal liability apart from the bond. The traditional rule
is that the injunction plaintiff is not liable in the absence of a bond.
Once he posts a bond he becomes liable up to the amount of the bond,
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either directly to the injured defendant or indirectly to the surety who
pays the defendant's damages. But there has been no middle ground
in which the plaintiff is personally liable in the absence of a bond. Personal liability is not new, of course; it exists now when a bond is posted.
And is avoided only when it is not.
Yet personal liability is an attractive solution for a great many
cases where no bond is posted. In the first place, provision for it is
simple. It does not require elaborate categorization of cases or the
erection of a fund that requires management and taxation. It also
tends to resolve some difficult problems. The railroad that enjoined a
tax without posting a bond caused a local government many thousands
of dollars of loss, but the railroad had no liability. A rule of personal
liability of the plaintiff would have held the railroad liable for the harm
it actually caused. Such a rule would compensate the defendant when
the injunction proved erroneous, and it would also encourage the plaintiff to provide a bond for the purpose of limiting liability. Personal
liability is also a good partial solution to the problem of the poor plaintiff. If there is personal liability for all who obtain a provisional order,
the plaintiff who in fact is not so poor as he claims will be liable to
the defendant for compensation when the injunction proves erroneous.
He will, presumably, be deterred from making unnecessary provisional
claims and likewise from claiming poverty that does not exist. If the
plaintiff is in fact too poor to post a bond, it may be that personal liability will not aid the defendant at all. But even so, the threat of liability itself may be sufficient to deter a frivolous claim. -And a provision for personal liability, combined with the possibility of private
sureties, covers the great bulk of cases.
(d) Liquidated damages and limited liability. Several important practical questions remain concerning the upper and lower limits
of liability. First, a minimum bond amount must be provided by statute if the mandatory bond is to be truly mandatory. It is the failure
to make such a provision that led federal courts to conclude the bond
could be dispensed with, since in the absence of a minimum sum it
was thought that the court could set the bond at a nominal amount.
Such provisions are not uncommon in the case of other provisionalorder statutes. North Carolina, for example, requires a bond of 250
dollars in the case of attachments.248
An entirely separate question is whether a liquidated sum should
be recoverable on the bond or against the plaintiff personally. Pro246. N.C.

GEN. STAT. §

1-440.10 (1969).
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vision could be made for two kinds of liquidated damages. One kind
would simply forfeit the bond in toto as liquidated damages. The
other kind would provide for a statutory sum to be used as liquidated
damages in the event the injured defendant failed to prove greater
losses. For instance, the 250 dollar minimum bond figure used in
North Carolina attachment cases might furnish both a good floor here
and also a reasonable liquidated figure that the defendant could recover
in any case where the injunction proved to be erroneous. The advantages of such liquidated awards are considerable-there is a constant deterrent to misuse of the provisional procedure and there is a
constant source of funds for the injured defendant who is unable to
prove his losses. Such a liquidation, for example, could help offset the
defendant's attorney's fees and help compensate for unprovable losses.
The automatic feature of liquidated damages should also reduce time
spent in litigating the damages issue after the injunction has proved
erroneous.
If a minimum bond sum is set by statute and if liquidated damages are provided, there remains the question of fixing liability when
no bond is posted. Liability in the liquidated sum should furnish a
suitable minimum, and additional liability for all of the defendant's
actual damages would be appropriate. An exception could be provided for the plaintiff who shows he is unable to post a bond. The
plaintiff who posts a bond knows that his liability for damages cannot
exceed the bond sum. If this rule is maintained a similar knowledge
ought to be available to the poor person who cannot post a bond. Thus
the injunction plaintiff who claims to be unable to provide a bond
could be permitted to petition for an upper limit on his liability, analogous to the bond limit -in other cases. If the fimit is set higher
than he is willing to risk, he can withdraw his claim. Though it may
seem absurd to speak of liability limits for persons too poor to afford
even a minimal bond premium, there are reasons for doing so: in the
first place, not every one who claims to be poor is in fact poor; and in
the second place, not everyone who is in fact poor remains so.
(e) The ex parte claim. By far the most dangerous form of
provisional order is the lRO, where the defendant has no hearing at
all. It would be possible to provide for mandatory bonds in all TRO
cases-perhaps without the exception for poor persons-and leave the
bond problem at the preliminary stage to the judge's discretion. After
all, the argument would run, the defendant is present at the preliminary injunction stage, and he can argue for a bond or for a high amount
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on the bond in that hearing. The judge can hardly be inadvertent at
that stage, and the bond can be adjusted as may be needed. But the
practicalities are that the preliminary stage itself may be too rushed to
permit much development of collateral arguments about the bond.
Neither party is involved with ultimate liabilities at that moment; each
is involved instead with the immediate problems. Though adjustments
in the bonds are appropriate at the preliminary stage, it seems impractical to force parties and the judge to consider bond issues at this point.
An across-the-board rule for a minimum bond seems preferable, with
discretion of the judge controlling only the amounts above the minimum.
(f) The government injunction. By statute in many states, various governmental units are excused from the requirement of a bond.
It is probably neither feasible nor helpful to require a bond of a governmental unit. If the governmental unit is solvent, its credit need not
be guaranteed, and to impose a bond requirement upon the government
merely adds an extra cost.
This is not, however, to say that the governmental unit should not
be liable from its own funds. Curiously, the North Carolina amendments to Rule 65(c) added two exemptions to the normal bond requirement. One covers the domestic relations case in which ancillary
injunctive relief is also requested; the other covers the injunction
sought by various governmental units. After exempting the named
parties from a bond requirement, the statute states that the exemptions
do not relieve the parties from liability for damages under the rule. The
idea seems to be that the governmental unit that seeks provisional relief must be willing, like anyone else, to bear responsibility -for damages
incurred when the haste of provisional relief leads to erroneous results.
The solution is a good one and forms a good model for other
cases-that is, the imposition of personal liability upon the applicant
for provisional injunctive relief, quite apart from any bond he may or
may not have posted.
C.

Conclusionsand Recommendations

The following conclusions and proposals for statutory change seem
warranted from what has been said:
1. The provisional injunctive bond should be mandatory in some
minimal amount, probably one thousand dollars.
2. The bond should provide for liquidated forfeiture in the event
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of an erroneous provisional injunction in some small sum, probably
250 dollars.
3. Where no bond is posted, the plaintiff should be held personally liable for liquidated damages as a minimum or for all actual damages proven, at the defendant's option, except
4. Where the plaintiff is unable to procure a bond, the judge
may set the limits of liability, at any figure above the minimum, that
seems reasonably calculated to cover likely damages.
V.

PROPOSED STATUTE

The statute proposed below attempts to reflect the recommendations above with a minimum change in structure and wording of the
existing Rule 65. This is not because the existing structure and wording are particularly desirable. A number of changes might well be
made both in substance and form, but it seems desirable to confine the
efforts here to the matters encompassed in the study and the recommendations. The bracketed words are new. The others are identical
except for a slight rearrangement in one case.
Rule 65. Injunctions.

(c) Security [and liability of the applicant.]
No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except
upon the giving of security by the applicant2 4 7 for the payment of such
costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is
found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. [The judge
shall set the amount of the security in a sum he deems sufficient to cover
probable damage in the event the injunction or restraint is wrongfully
issued, but the amount shall not be less than $1,000. The judge shall
not dispense with the requirement of security except]
(1) no security shall be required of the State of North Carolina
or of any county or municipality thereof, or any officer or agency
thereof acting in an official capacity, but damages may be awarded
248
against such party in accord with this rule;
247. The phrase "in such sum as the court deems proper" is dropped here. The
next sentence states the basis for fixing the bond.
248. This language is identical with the original. In the original it seems clearly to
imply liability on the part of the state or official apart from the bond. Under the version here, the implication is even clearer because personal liability is clearer. This proposed version does not seem to change the implications of the statute.
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(2) [no security shall -be required] in suits between spouses relating to support, alimony, custody of children, separation, divorce from
bed and board, and absolute divorce as a condition precedent to the
issuing of a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction enjoining the other spouse2 49 from interfering with, threatening, or in
any way molesting the plaintiff spouse during pendency of the suit,
until further order of the court, but damages may be awarded against
such party in accord with this rule;"'

[(3) the judge may dispense with ithe security in his discretion
when the applicant for a restraining order or a preliminary injunction
shows that he is financially unable to obtain sureties, or that, if he is
financially able to obtain sureties, one or more corporate sureties has
in good faith refused to execute a bond in his behalf.]
[If a restraining order or preliminary injunction is obtained without posting security, the applicant who obtains the order or injunction
is liable for damages in accord with the provisions of paragraph (e).
If the judge dispenses with the security as provided in subparagraph
(3) above, he may also limit the personal liability of the applicant to
a sum he deems sufficient to cover probable damages to the other parties in the event the injunction or restraining order is erroneously issued, but in no event may he limit liability to any sum less than
$1,000.]
[If the applicant obtains an order or injunction on behalf of one
who is not a party, and with that other's authority, express or implied,
the other is liable for damages in accord with the rules in subsetion (e).]
(e) Awards on dissolution. Any party wrongfully enjoined or
restrained may recover, in the same proceeding, an award to be determined by the judge, or by a referee appointed by the judge, [including
[(1) actual damages not in excess of ,the limit of personal liability set by the judge or the limit of the security; or
[(2) liquidated damages in the sum of $250.]
[Nothing herein shall prevent a recovery of damages based on malicious prosecution, abuse of process, or restitution without regard to
the limits of the bond or the liability set by the judge.]
249. The original read "defendant spouse." The term "other spouse" has been substituted to eliminate any doubt whether the same rule applies when the defendant in the
suit obtains the ancillary injunction.
250. Slight changes in the order of subparagraph (2) are introduced, purely for the
purpose of keeping the rules stated therein in parallel structure with the other subparagraphs.
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[(f) Any bond given with knowledge that it is intended to be
submitted in compliance wtih this rule, or with any judicial order made
pursuant to this rule, is deemed to cover the liabilities imposed by this
rule and any additional liabilities that may be imposed by the judge in
ordering a bond.]
Comment and Illustration
1. Security requirement. With exceptions to be discussed later,
this proposal changes the present statute to make it clear that security
is required in all applications for a TRO or preliminary injunction, to
be furnished in a sum no less than $1,000.
2. Exceptions for the state and its agencies. The present rule
that the state and its agencies are not required to post security is retained.
3. Marital disputes. The present rule as affecting marital disputes does not require security and that rule is likewise maintained
here.
4. When security may be dispensed with. Subparagraph (3)
permits the judge to dispense with the requirement of security in certain
narrowly defined situations, and even then he must exercise discretion.
He is not authorized to dispense with security unless the applicant
shows that he is financially unable to obtain sureties or that one or
more corporate sureties has refused to execute a bond on his behalf.
Thus the fact that relief will be delayed if he must obtain a surety, or
that damages may be unlikely, are not grounds for dispensing with the
security required by this rule. This is so because the judge's opportunity to get facts and make judgments about the likelihood of damages is
necessarily limited, and the rule adopts the position that the applicant
who wishes extraordinary relief must protect against the risks he creates, even if those risks are not all foreseeable at the time the application is made.
Illustration 1. A applies for a TRO to prevent the Sheriff from
dispersing a political rally, which the Sheriff threatens to do the next
morning. A contends that this violates his right of speech and assembly and asks for a TRO without posting security. He argues that
(a) damages are not likely to the Sheriff and (b) that in any event he
has not had time to find a surety. The judge is not authorized to dispense with the security requirement on either ground, but may accept
a private surety or tangible property as adequate security.
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5. Exercise of discretion. Once it is established that the applicant is unable to obtain security for the reasons specified, the judge is
authorized to dispense with security, but he is not required to do so.
Various factors may be considered at this stage. Although the fact
that damages are not deemed likely to result is not a fact that warrants
dispensing with security under this rule, it is a fact that may be considered once some other warrant exists for doing so. If the applicant
is financially unable to post security, the judge may be influenced to
dispense with security partly because damages to the defendant are
unlikely. Another factor in the judge's discretion is the availability
of alternative kinds of security. The applicant who cannot post a bond
executed by a commercial surety may nevertheless find suitable, or at
least partly suitable, private persons who would execute a bond, or he
may be able to put up property. Another factor may arise in the kind
of case that could be brought by any one of a large number of persons,
some of whom may be able to post security while others are not. If
an applicant for relief has been deliberately selected by a group because he is insolvent, the judge may wish to insist upon the normal security requirement. See Illustration 6, below.
6. Applicant's liability. If security is posted in accordance with
this statute and whatever rules are imposed by the judge, the security
itself is liable for damages and of course the applicant will be liable
over to the surety. The applicant himself is liable and might be proceeded against if for any reason that is desirable. When security is
posted in accordance with these rules, the applicant's liability remains,
as it is now, limited to the amount of security.
When the applicant avoids posting security, he is liable without
limit for damages caused by his wrongful order, unless he procures an
order of the judge (a) dispensing with security for the reasons stated
above and (b) limiting his liability to a stated amount. The limits
of liability may not be reduced below $1,000 in any event.
Illustration 2. N seeks a preliminary injunction against D's further deposit of wastes in the Hoo River, claiming D's wastes constitute
a public nuisance and a violation of statutes. The judge requires a
bond of $1500 and N posts it. Thereafter the preliminary injunction
issues. D sustains $25,000 in damages as a result of the injunction,
which ultimately proves wrongful because D's wastes were not found to
be polluting the river. N and his surety are jointly and severally liable, but only for $1500, the amount of the security.
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Illustration 3. Same facts except that the judge, on a finding that
N is unable to obtain a surety, dispenses with the security requirement.
He does not set any maximum for N's personal liability, however. N
is personally liable for $25,000.
Illustration 4. Same facts except that the judge, on a finding that
N is unable to obtain a surety, dispenses with the security requirement.
He sets N's maximum liability at $3,000. N is liable for $3,000.
As indicated in the text, there seems to be a tendency to set security (or, here, personal liability) far too low. These illustrations are
thus realistic, but they are not intended to suggest that such a practice
is a desirable one.
7. Liability of others. The proposed statute imposes a liability
upon persons who are not themselves applying for an injunction, if
the applicant applies on their behalf under implicit or explicit authority
to do so. This provision is inserted to discourage persons from seeking out an insolvent to bring a claim for provisional relief, so as to defeat the purposes of the rules. However, there is no liability visited
upon a third person merely because he benefits from the provisional
order, unless he also authorizes application for it. The burden of
proving authorization is, of course, on the party claiming damage.
Illustration 5. An environmental organization obtains a TRO to
prevent the dumping of untreated wastes in the river. A downstream
owner, X, benefits from this order because after the sewage is stopped,
he is able to water his stock in the river and is not required to pump
fresh water for them. The order is later found to be erroneous, because, although the wastes pollute the water, it is not regarded as sufficiently serious to constitute a nuisance. The applicant for the injunction is liable on the rules already stated, but X is not liable at all, since
he has not authorized the application on his behalf, either tacitly or
otherwise.
Illustration 6. L, the owner of an apartment house, wishes to obtain provisional relief against B, a builder who is about to erect a building next door, allegedly in violation of zoning regulations. To avoid
posting security or incurring substantial liability, L induces T, a tenant,
to bring suit and seek provisional relief, on the ground that T will have
standing to sue and can avoid posting security or incurring any effective loss. T seeks provisional relief. If the judge is apprised of the
above facts, he will probably refuse relief from the security requirement under the rules stated in Comment 5, supra.
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Illustration 7. Same facts as Illustration 6, except that the judge
does not know of L's role. He dispenses with the requirement of security and sets T's maximum liability at $1,000. The preliminary injunction later proves to be wrongfully issued and B is damaged in the
sum of $3,000. T and L are jointly and severally liable for $1,000,
and, in addition, L is liable personally for 'the remaining $2,000 in
damages suffered by B. In other words, under this rule, L is not better
off by reason of this effort to avoid the rules.
The present procedure contemplates that the damages, if any, will
be awarded in the same proceeding on application by the injured party.
This procedure is retained, but it has an added significance here, since
a non-party can be held liable under the rules just stated. No particular procedure is specified here for bringing in the non-party, such as
L in the illustrations above. There seems no need for special procedures; ordinary service of process, accompanied by a complaint or petition or written motion in the same case should be sufficient.
8. Damages. The basic rules of damages are not changed.
However, subsection (e) does provide for recovery of a small liquidated
sum at the option of the enjoined party. The theory is that there are
always some damages, even if they are not provable. The rule used
in federal and North Carolina courts that attorneys' fees are not recoverable items of damages in these cases is not changed, but the liquidated sum will no doubt assuage the effects of. this rule without
fundamentally changing it.
Where security is required, the old practice of limiting damages
to the amount of required security is retained. However, there is now
a $1,000 minimum requirement on security or the personal liability
substitute. Where security is not required, the applicant's personal liability is limited only by the actual damages proven, unless the judge
sets in advance a maximum liability at the time he dispenses with the
bond. It is not contemplated that the judge has discretion to set a
maximum liability at a later stage, or to refuse to assess damages that
are actually proven.
Subsection (e) also recognizes the existing law on the subject of
recoveries independent of those under this rule. It does not attempt to
limit the theories on which such independent recoveries can be had,
but does explicitly recognize both tort and restitutionary grounds.
There is no attempt here -to spell out how a recovery under this rule
should be credited to limit damages under a malicious prosecution recovery or vice versa. That is left tod4he courts to handle if and when
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it arises. Presumably one who has paid a judgment under this rule,
would be given credit for that payment if he were also held liable for
malicious prosecution, to the extent that the elements of damages were
identical.
9. Additional liability. Historically the chancellor could demand a bond, conditioned as he saw fit, as a prerequisite to any provisional relief he might give. The addition of statutes does not seem
to have changed this power in the chancellor. Thus it is presumably
true that he might impose conditions to relief that are not traditional
under the rules. For example, the chancellor, if he has discretion to
deny relief at all, might deny it unless a bond were posted in which
attorneys' fees, as well as other items of damages, were covered. The
present rule makes no provision about this but does collaterally recognize that such added conditions might be imposed in particular cases
by providing in subsection (f) that the surety is liable under the rule
if he knows the bond is given under the rule, and that he is liable for
additional conditions imposed by the judge if he knows of them. This
of course does not authorize the judge to impose any new or additional
liabilities after the security is given. At the stage in which he is assessing damages, he must follow the traditional rules of damage measurement and the rules set out here unless his initial order is conditioned
upon an undertaking for additional liabilities.
10. Surety's liability. This remains basically unchanged except
that liquidated damages may be recovered under the new rule. Subsection (f) makes it clear that the surety's liability is not less than that
imposed by this rule, or by the judge's order for a bond, if the surety
knows the bond is given to comply with the rule or the order. This is
the result in some courts now, but because of the older practice of
judges to spell out individual bond conditions, it would be possible to
hold, as some courts have, that the terms of the bond rather than the
terms of the rule apply. Subsection (f) resolves this potential dispute
by providing that the bond "covers" liabilities under the rule or the
judge's order. It does not prevent the surety from undertaking added
liabilities; it simply insists that the minimum is that contemplated by
the rule -andthe judge's order.
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Appendix I
American Injunction Bond Statutes
Note: This list includes the general statute where there is one, but it omits
a citation of special statutes enacted in some states to cover specific kinds
of injunctions. Usually, however, specific statutes can be found in the same
portion of the statute books as the general sections here cited.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
Federal
ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 1043 (1958).
Alabama
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 65 (c).
Alaska
Aruz. R. Civ. P. 65(e).
Arizona
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 32-207 (1962).
Arkansas
CAL. Civ. PRO. CODE § 529 (West 1954).
California
CoLo. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
Colorado
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-472 (1958).
Connecticut
DEL. CH. CT. CIv. R. 65 (c).
Delaware
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.610(b).
Florida
GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-165(c) (1972).
Georgia
HAwAI R. Civ. P. 65(c).
Hawaii
IDAHO CODE § 8-405 (Supp. 1973).
Idaho
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 69, §§ 8-9 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada

1974).
IND. R. Civ. P. 15.
IOWA R. Civ. P. 327.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-903 (1964).
KY. R. Civ. P. 65.05.
LA. CODE Civ. PRO. ANN. art. 3610 (West 1961).
ME. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
MD. R.P. BB75(a).
No general statute.
MicH. GEN. Cr. R. 718.3.
MINN. R. Civ. App. P. 65.03.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-13-5 (1972).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 526.070 (1953).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-4207 (1964).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1067 (1964).
NEv. R. Civ. P. 65(c).
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New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 249.
N.J. Cv. PRAC. R. 4:52-3.
N.M.R. Civ. P. 65, 66(c).
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 6312(b) (McKinney 1963).
N.C.R. Civ. P. 65(c).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-06-05 (1960).
OHiO R. Civ. P. 65(c).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1392 (1961).
ORE. REv. STAT. § 32.020 (1973).
PA. R. Crv. P. 1531.
R.I.R. Civ. P. 65(c).
S.C. CODE ANN § 10-2057 (1962).
S.D. CoMPILED LAWS ANN. § 21-8-10 (1967).
TENN. R. Crv. P. 65.05.
TEx. R. Civ.. P. 684.
UTAH

R. Crv. P. 65A(c).

R. Civ. P. 65 (c).
VA. CODE § 8-623 (1957).

VT.

WASH. REv. CODE ANN.

§ 7.80.080 (1961).

W. VA. CODE § 53-5-9 (1966).
WIs. STAT. § 268.06 (1957).
Wyo. R. Civ. P. 65 (c).

Appendix 11
Development of Federal Statutes
1. The 1872 statute, Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 7, 17 Stat. 197.
See. 7. That whenever notice is given of a motion for an injunction out of a circuit or district court of the United States, the
court or judge thereof may, if there appear to be danger of irreparable injury from delay, grant an order restraining the act sought
to be enjoined until the decision upon the motion. Such order may
be granted with or without security, in the discretion of the court
or judge. ...
With virtually no change this section was incorporated in the Revised
Statutes of 1875 as § 718.
2. The Judiciary Act of 1911, ch. 231, § 263, 36 Stat. 1162.
See. 263. Whenever notice is given of a motion for an injunction out of a district court, the court or judge thereof may, if there
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appears to be danger of irreparable injury from delay, grant an order restraining -the act sought to be enjoined until the decision upon
the motion; and such order may be granted with or without security, in the discretion of the court or judge.
This section was repealed in 1914 by § 17 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323,
§ 17, 38 Stat. 737 (1914).
3. The Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 16-18, 38 Stat. 737-38 (1914).
This statute provided the language that later became the basic language
of the judicial code and of rule 65. Section 16 provided that any person
could sue for injunctive relief "against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws . . . under the same conditions and principles

as injunctive relief. . is granted by courts of equity, under the rules governing such proceedings, and upon the execution of proper bond against
damages for an injunction improvidently granted ....

.

Section 17 required notice in the case of preliminary injunctions and restricted the grant of temporary restraining orders to cases of great clarity.
It imposed procedural limits upon -thegrant of interlocutory relief and went
on to repeal § 263 of the 1911 Judiciary Act.
Section 18 provided:
That, except as otherwise provided in section 16 of this Act,
no restraining order or interlocutory order of injunction shall issue,
except upon the giving of security by the applicant in such sum
as the court or judge may deem proper, conditioned upon the payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered
by any party who may be found to have been wrongfully enjoined
or restrained thereby.
4. The Judicial Code of 1926, § 382, 44 Stat. 909.
This was a new official codification. It carried over the language of
§ 18 of the Clayton Act into the general provisions of the judicial code as
section 382 of title 28 of the United States Code.
5. Rule 65, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 65 carried over almost the exact language of section 18 and added
additional provisions, strengthening the distinction between the preliminary
injunction and the TRO -that had appeared in the 1911 statute. The basic
provision, however, is identical to the Clayton Act and the 1926 Judicial
Code. What little material .there is generally available on the promulgation
of the rules does not indicate extensive debate or reconsideration of rule 65
at all.
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Appendix I
Development of North Carolina Statutes
1. New York Code of Procedure, ch. 379, § 195, [1848] Laws of New
York 534.
§ 195. Where no provision is made by statute, as to security
upon an injunction, the judge shall require a written undertaking,
on the part of the plaintiff, with or without sureties, to the effect
that -theplaintiff will pay to the party enjoined, such damages, not
exceeding an amount to be specified, as he may sustain by reason
of the injunction, if the court shall finally decide that the plaintiff
was not entitled thereto. The damages may be ascertained by a
reference, or otherwise, as the court shall direct.
2. North Carolina Code of Civil Procedure of 1868, § 192.
§ 192. Security upon injunction. Damages.-Upon granting an order for an injunction, the Judge shall require as a condition precedent to the issuing thereof, that the clerk shall take from
the plaintiff a written undertaking, with sufficient sureties to be justified before, and approved by the said clerk or by the Judge, in
an amount to be fixed by the Judge, to the effect that the plaintiff
will pay to the party enjoined, such damages, not exceeding an
amount to be specified, as he may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the Court shall finally decide that the plaintiff was not entitled thereto. The damages may be ascertained by a reference, or
otherwise, as the Judge shall direct.
3. The 1883 Code of North Carolina.
In 1883 the General Assembly enacted an entire code of law as a single
statute. Act of Feb. 27, 1883, ch. 191, § 6, [1833] N.C. Sess. Laws 315.
Most of it was based upon existing law as arranged by the codifiers and then
simply enacted by the legislature. The bond requirement remained the
same as it had been in 1868, with the exception of these changes:
(a) The section number became Section 341.
(b) The organization was changed so that it appeared in a chapter
on injunction, rather than in a chapter on provisional remedies. This necessitated a minor addition to make the bond requirement apply "[ulpon granting
a restraining order or an order for an injunction . ...
(c) A new clause was added at the end of the section so that the last
sentence read, with the addition italicized:
"The damages may be ascertained by a reference or otherwise, as the
judge shall direct, and the decision of the court thereupon shall be conclusive
as to -the amount of damages upon all the persons who have an interest in
the undertaking."
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This last clause does not seem to have prior legislative basis, but, since
,the 1883 Code was officially enacted and was not merely a printing by an
editor or revisor, this clause became law.
4. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 251, [1893] N.C. Sess. Laws 206:
Section 1. That section three hundred and forty-one of The
Code be amended by adding thereto the following: "Judgment dissolving the injunction shall carry with it judgment for such damages
against the plaintiff and his sureties on said undertaking without
the requirement of malice or want of probable cause in procuring
the injunction."*
Section 2. That this act shall be in force from and after its
ratification.
5. North Carolina General Statutes, sections 1-496 to -497 (repealed
inch. 954, § 4, [1967] N.C. Sess. Laws 1354.
[These statutes reflect the codification that was also reflected in the revisals and codes published between 1893 and -the publication of the General
Statutes. This codification merely integrates the 1893 amendment set forth
in paragraph (3) above with slight changes in terminology and punctuation].
§ 1-496. Undertaking-Upon granting a restraining order or
an order for an injunction, the judge shall require as a condition
precedent to the issuing thereof that the clerk shall take from the
plaintiff a written undertaking, with sufficient sureties, to be justified before, and approved by, the clerk or judge, in an amount to
be fixed by the judge, to the effect that the plaintiff will pay to
the party enjoined such damages, not exceeding an amount to be
specified, as he sustains by reason of the injunction, if the court
finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to it.
§ 1-497. Damages on dissolution-A judgment dissolving an
injunction carries with it judgment for damages against the party
procuring it and the sureties on his undertaking without the requirement of malice or want of probable cause in procuring the injunction, which damages may be ascertained by a reference or otherwise, as the judge directs, and the decision of the court is conclusive
as to the amount of damages upon all the persons who have -an
interest in the undertaking.
6. N.C.R. Civ. P. 65.
(c) Security.-No restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of security by the applicant,
in such sum as the judge deems proper, for the payment of such
costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party
* This statute was passed to reverse the holdings of the North Carolina Supreme
Court to the effect that no action would lie on the bond unless the claimant could show
that the plaintiff had acted maliciously and without probable cause in bringing the
claim for provisional remedy. See Burnett v. Nicholson, 79 N.C. 548 (1878).
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who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained. No
such security shall be required of the State of North Carolina or
of any county or municipality thereof, or any officer or agency
thereof acting in an official capacity, but damages may be awarded
against such party in accord with this rule. In suits between
spouses relating to support, alimony, custody of children, separation, divorce from bed and board, and absolute divorce no such
security shall be required of the plaintiff spouse as a condition precedent to the issuing of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction enjoining the defendant spouse from interfering with,
threatening, or in any way molesting the plaintiff spouse during
pendency of the suit, until further order of the court, but damages
may be awarded against such party in accord with this rule.
A surety upon a bond or undertaking under this rule submits
himself to the jurisdiotion of the court and irrevocably appoints the
clerk of the court as his agent upon whom any papers affecting his
liability on the bond or undertaking may be served. His liability
may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent
action. The motion and such notice of the motion as the court prescribes may be served on the clerk of the court, who shall forthwith
mail copies to the persons giving the security and the sureties
thereon if their addresses are known.
(e) Damages on dissolution.-An order or judgment dissolving an injunction or restraining order may include an award of
damages against the party procuring the injunction and the sureties
on his undertaking without a showing of malice or want of probable
cause in procuring the injunction. The damages may be determined by the judge, or he may direct that they be determined by
a referee or jury.

